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There are two possible ways for a firm to grow its business in the international market. One is greenfield 
investment, which consists in expanding the firm’s production by setting a new plant abroad, hiring workers 
and increasing other factors of production. The other is cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which 
involves scaling up the production externally by acquiring a combination of already existing production 
factors. This second type of business strategy has quickened in the ‘90s (during the so called “fifth merger 
wave”) following the increased globalization and deregulation of the markets, and further expanded in more 
recent times: the value of global net M&As has almost doubled over the last five years. 
Acquiring or merging with an existing firm offers both advantages and disadvantages compared to greenfield 
investments. Cross-border M&As allows the acquiring firm to save substantial time, get knowledge of local 
market conditions, obtain technologies protected by patents, inherit relationships with local suppliers/buyers 
and gain market power by eliminating competitors. On the con side, mergers and acquisitions – compared to 
greenfield investment - are typically less scalable, require larger investments and involve higher risks. Plus, 
since the acquisition of the firms usually includes all their features and employees, in some cases they may 
exhibit excess capacity or run inefficient plants. 
In Italy, this phenomenon has gained higher economic and political relevance, following the sharp increase of 
both number and volume of inward cross-border M&As within the last two decades: from the acquisition of 
Bnl by Bnp Paribas in 2006, and Gucci, taken over by Kering during the ’00s, to the more recent acquisition 
of Bulgari by Lvmh Group in 2011 (the same year in which Lactalis takes control of Parmalat), until 2015, 
when ChemChina becomes the main shareholder of the Pirelli Group. However, across the years, cross-border 
M&As have not gone without criticism, mainly because of their consequences on domestic firms. In the 
popular debate, in fact, the negative effects of these operations – such as loss of national control or workforce 
rationalization - have been largely stressed. However, according to economic theory, foreign acquisitions 
should also generate high-skill jobs, better salaries and higher productivity in the target firms. The question, 
then, is whether a domestic firm benefits or not - in terms of its performance - from a foreign acquisition. 
The issue has been the subject of research in the economic field for the last two decades. Inquiries about the 
effects of M&A on the target firms' performance were first discussed in the ’90s, however the research effort 
intensified in the ‘00s following the increasing M&A activity worldwide and the improvement in econometric 
techniques. Studies have mainly focused their attention on two key measures of firms’ performance – 
productivity and employment/wage – but often reaching contrasting results, due to different observation units 
(firm or plant), type of industries considered (manufacturing or service) and empirical methods employed 
(regression or matching).  
The present dissertation builds on the economic research about cross border M&A and their effects on the 
acquired firm's performance. In particular, this thesis aims to shed some light on the causal effects of cross-
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border M&As on domestic firms' performances - productivity and employment - taking into account M&A 
specific features such as type of M&A, industry heterogeneity, type of buyer, capital share and distance. The 
thesis tries to answer two main questions: what are the short and long-term impacts of cross-border M&A on 
target firms’ productivity and employment, and which variable affected this impact? The results will allow to 
draw some conclusions about the causal effect of M&A deals on target firms’ performance, and its key factors. 
The thesis consists of two chapters. Although each chapter can be read separately, as they are based on stand-
alone papers with their own introduction and conclusion, the second chapter is a natural continuation of the 
first one. The structure and the storyline of the thesis are the following: the first chapter investigates the causal 
effect of cross-border M&A by using a Propensity Score matching approach; the second chapter focuses on 
the key factors which may be responsible for this effect by running the same matching methodology. Thus, the 
second chapter builds on the dataset and results deriving from the first chapter. The firm-level panel dataset 
includes all cross-border M&As targeting Italian firms and resulting with a control share (≥ 50%) between the 
years 2010 and 2013. The core dataset is a combined dataset which matches information on cross-border M&A 
deals (Reprint by Ice and Politecnico di Milano and Zephyr by Bureau van Dijk) with data on the balance 
sheets of Italian firms (AIDA by Bureau van Dijk). This allows, in the first chapter, to study the impact of 
M&As deals on Italian target firms. To further understand which M&A deals features may have affected the 
size and sign of the impact -which is the objective of the second chapter- the core dataset is enriched with an 
additional database, containing information on the balance sheets of International acquiring firms (Orbis by 
Bureau van Dijk). The number of observations differs between the two chapters: in the first chapter, the 
observations are 612 (out of 1155, due to the presence of missing data for relevant variables in Italian target 
firms’ balance sheet, guaranteeing a coverage of 53%), while in the second chapter the sample is restricted to 
504 observations, due to missing data for relevant variables in International acquiring firms’ balance sheet. 
Let’s briefly review the main features, contributions and findings of the two chapters. The first chapter, “Effect 
of cross border M&As on target firms”, begins with a short theoretical discussion followed by a more extensive 
empirical literature review on the effects of cross-border M&As on target firms’ performance – i.e. productivity 
and employment. Then, the identification strategy is explained: by using a difference-in-differences propensity 
score matching – which involves the inclusion of a control group of non-target domestic firms - it will be 
possible to overcome the selection problem – i.e. target firms would perform better irrespective of ownership 
because foreign investors acquire only better performing firms. After describing the data and presenting the 
main limitations, the causal effect of cross-border M&As on target firms’ performance is analyzed with the 
software STATA; what results show is a positive and significant long-term effect of ownership change on both 
productivity and employment of target Italian firms, peaking respectively in the third and fifth year after the 
acquisition. 
The second chapter, “Key factors affecting the impact of cross border M&As on target firms”, begins by 
offering a review of most relevant empirical papers on factors affecting the impact of cross border M&As, 
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such as investment motive, industry heterogeneity, capital share, distance, ecc. Then, the attention is focused 
on one of those, which has been entirely neglected by previous studies, namely the type of buyer. The next 
section explains the identification strategy that has been adopted – i.e. difference-in-differences propensity 
score matching, following the analysis done in the first chapter. Descriptive statistics on these key variables 
are provided and, afterwards, data are analyzed through propensity score matching in STATA. What emerges 
is the key role played by the type of buyer which, according to business economic theory, can be either strategic 
or financial; in particular, when target firms are acquired by financial buyers – i.e. investors who operate in the 
financial sector – they reduce their productivity. That can be explained by the fact that financial buyers are 
generally more interested in generating high return for investors than in transferring best practices and reaching 
positive synergies with the acquired firms. 
















Over the last decade there has been a significant increase in the number of M&A activities: according to 
UNCTAD (2019) in 2018 the value of global net M&As has almost doubled over the last five years1 and  
expressed as a percentage of FDI inflows has reached its highest level - 62 per cent - since the height of the 
dotcom boom in 2000. Cross-border M&As have gained importance starting from the ‘90 due to the greater 
globalization and deregulation of the markets, which characterizes the “fifth merger wave”, usually following 
tightly the trend of stock prices (S&P 500), as they are driven by a similar combination of factors2.  The reason 
why a firm should prefer as entry mode to a new market the establishment a foreign subsidiary, instead of 
building a new plant from scratch (greenfield investment), is generally to acquired knowledge of local market 
conditions, inherit relationships with local suppliers or buyers and wipe out direct competitors. 
A large number of studies have engaged in analyzing the impact of inward FDI on firm performance in the 
host country of the investment. Both direct effects on a subsidiary of a multinational enterprise and indirect 
effects, or spillovers, on domestic enterprises in the host economy have been extensively investigated in the 
economic literature. Still, many studies do not make any distinction between the different foreign market entry 
modes, i.e. greenfield and cross border M&A. In the popular debate concerning foreign acquisition of domestic 
firms (as opposed to greenfield investments) the negative aspects – which are loss of national control and 
outsourcing of the domestic production to other countries - have been often emphasized. However, in the 
economic literature foreign ownership is very often associated with greater productivity, high-skill jobs and 
better wages. 
Existing studies on the impact of cross border M&A on host country have tended to focus their analyses on the 
direct effect of the process of internationalization on domestic companies, evaluated in terms of changes in 
R&D, productivity, employment or output. However, these studies present an ambiguous picture, as they often 
find opposite effects. The reasons why empirical results tend to differ are typically related to: different datasets 
employed - number of observations included, the covered time periods, countries, industries, etc. - different 
empirical methods – in particular, earlier studies did often not control for selection bias -  different types of 
mergers considered – either horizontal, vertical or both – and also different observation unit – firm or plant 
level.  
Within this context, the goal of this first chapter is to measure the effects of cross border M&A on target firms’ 
performance, looking at the recent case of Italy (2010-2013). This is done by creating an integrated micro data 
set (Reprint and Zephyr) which covers all Italian firms subject to cross-border M&A deals over the period 
2010-2013. Thereby, this piece of research contributes to shed more light on the role of foreign investment as 
 
1 From 428126 millions of dollars in 2014 to 815726 millions of dollars in 2018. 
2 Such as strong economic performance, cheap cost of borrowing, rising investor confidence and often a mix of 
technological and structural change. 
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a potential driver of efficiency and employment growth by addressing the following question: what is the short 
and long-term impact of cross-border M&A on target firms’ productivity and employment? 
Productivity is measured in terms of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) by following the approach of Levinsohn 
& Petrin which generates unbiased input elasticities by using intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobservable 
productivity shocks. To address the selection bias, resulting from the fact that foreign investors may acquire 
better performing firms, the causal effect of foreign acquisition on Italian firm performance is estimated 
controlling for observable characteristics through a difference-in-difference propensity score matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
Results lead a positive long-term effect of cross-border M&A deals on Italian target firms’ performance. In 
fact, domestic firms coming under foreign control between the years 2010-2013 show both an increase in 
productivity and in employment - from the third year after the deal on. The absence of positive and significant 
short-term effects can be either related to the reorganization and restructuration costs target firms may incur 
right after the acquisition or the delayed onset of foreign-ownership beneficial effects (such as increased 
efficiency or market power).  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews relevant theoretical and empirical literature, section 3 
describes the identification strategy implemented (Difference-in-Difference Matching), section 4 provides the 
results of the work based upon the methodology, section 5 includes the most relevant robustness checks and, 
lastly, section 6 summarizes the main findings.  
1.2 Theoretical background and empirical literature 
According to theory, domestic firms can benefit from foreign ownership thanks to the direct flows of 
knowledge (“technology transfer”) and good practices (“efficiency gains”) from the foreign subsidiaries to the 
parent firms. The seminal contribution of Dunning (1977) already pointed out at ownership advantages – 
intended as endowments of intangible assets that compensate for the lack of local knowledge – typically 
possessed by multinational firms and potentially transferable to their subsidiaries. One possible way to capture 
this knowledge and efficiency flow is by looking at the variation in the level of Research and Development 
(R&D). What the evidence seems to suggest is that the R&D intensity of target firms, both in terms of input 
and output, can be either positively and negatively affected by foreign ownership (Branstetter 2006, Stiebale 
2016). However, not all inventions and knowledge spillovers are codified – e.g. imitation or reverse 
engineering – thereby not all knowledge transfer can be captured by patent and patent citation flow data. Thus, 
many studies have engaged in measuring the impact of reverse knowledge transfer and its spillovers on the 
investing firms by using productivity indicators, such as Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or labour productivity.  
The industrial organization (I-O) literature distinguishes between short-term and long-term effects on target 
firm productivity. In the short run target firms will very likely incur in some restructuration and reorganization 
costs, which are short-term expenses required to make the company profitable in the long run. Merging or 
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acquired companies may indeed need some investments – e.g. to close overlapping activities or resources by 
breaking contracts, to transfer best practices, to ship the material resources, to build new plants or offices, etc. 
- in order to extract the expected potential synergies. Then, while in the short run the impact of a take-over can 
be potentially negative – as the delayed onset of beneficial effects cannot compensate the costs of 
reorganization - in the long run the effects are more mixed. On one hand, the market concentration potentially 
resulting from an M&A may involve a decline in competition, and then of productivity, in the whole sector; at 
the same time not always synergies between acquiring and target firms are achieved in post-merger integration 
process, which is particularly true for cross border M&A, where a loose in management control or a lower 
coordination can even reduce target firm overall efficiency. On the other, a long-run increase in productivity is 
expected to result from the diffusion of technological and organizational firm-specific knowledge, a better 
reallocation of production across firms, the presence of scale and input purchase economies and, lastly, the 
reduction of managerial and workforce slack (Bellak et al 2006).  
Multinational firms have indeed proven to own superior knowledge-based assets – both tangible and intangible 
– such as better product, more efficient production and marketing skills or an established brand name (Dunning 
1977, 1993, Karpaty 2007). These competitive advantages allow multinational firms to compete in a new 
market and compensate for fixed costs of establishment, lack of local information, experience and business 
relationships (Bertrand and Zitouna, 2008, Conyon et al. 2002). This argument is supported by most recent 
theories on international trade (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004), which show how in their model, among 
the group of the more productive firms which choose to serve the foreign markets, only the most productive 
will further choose to serve the overseas market via FDI. Thus, the transfer of multinationals' technological 
and managerial competences, along with a better access to foreign markets through sales affiliates and network 
economies, is likely to benefit local subsidiaries located in foreign countries. And, of course, the higher the 
ownership advantage that a multinational firm possesses, its transferability and the 
complementarity/relatedness with target firms' assets, the higher the productivity effect on the target firm is 
likely to be. 
However, the occurrence of long-run efficiency gains is very likely to depend on the motives driving the 
investment decisions. If, for example, the investment arises out of managers' utility maximization or of 
managers' preference for free cash rather than return it to investors (free cash flow hypothesis), instead of profit 
maximizing motives, efficiency gains will hardly materialized. The same might happens if the motive behind 
the acquisition is technology sourcing, rather than technology exploiting. 
According to I-O literature, both positive and negative long run effects on productivity are expected to be 
greater in the case of cross border M&A, compared to domestic one, as they are on average much larger 
(Grimpe and Hussinger 2008). This is explained by the fact that information asymmetries (both ex-ante and 
ex-post) and transaction costs - which are larger for foreign targets due to geo-cultural distance and institutional 
differences – are less severe for larger firms.  
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The effect of cross border M&A on firm performance has been investigated by many researchers using standard 
econometric techniques, typically by regressing productivity and other outcome variables on covariates such 
as the degree of internationalization of the firm (Caves 1989, Conyon et al. 2002, Piscitello and Rabbiosi 
2005). However, this kind of studies is not exempt from criticism as they are potentially subject to selection 
bias: target firms, compared to non-target, have different pre-acquisition characteristics that, other than 
attracting the interest of foreign investors (cherry vs lemon picking argument), have a direct impact on post-
acquisition performance; thus, being acquired by a foreign firm will be, in all likelihood, an endogenous 
process. To overcome this source of bias, a second stream of studies have adopted matching techniques, which 
seek to obtain unbiased estimates of the impact of cross border M&A on firms’ performance by matching target 
and not target firms with ex-ante similar characteristics. The assumption for which the two types of firms are 
ex-ante different has also been supported by empirical works (Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004, Karpaty 
2007) which show that the performance of foreign-owned and domestic firms can be ex-ante significantly 
different not only in level but also in growth rate, casting doubt on the validity of standard regression analyses.  
The existing empirical evidence on the causal link between international M&A and firm’s productivity is 
however inconclusive. While several studies have found a positive effect of foreign ownership on firm 
productivity (Arndt and Mattes 2010, for Germany; Bertand and Zitouna, 2008, for France; Conyon et al, 2002, 
for the UK; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1987 and Maksimovic et al, 2011, for the US), other studies have shown 
that domestic firms are not always able to reap the gains of foreign ownership (Gioia and Thomsen 2002, for 
Denmark; Girma and Gorg, 2007; Harris and Robinson 2002, for UK). Unfortunately, results are not easily 
comparable as studies differ in terms of datasets - number of observations included, the covered time periods, 
countries, industries, etc. - type of merger – either horizontal, vertical or both – and observation unit – firm or 
plant. 
Supposing the existence of efficiency gains, a crucial point for policy makers is the source of these 
improvements. Policy makers and trade unions often argue that productivity gains are the result of workforce 
rationalization, as M&A provide an opportunity to cancel contracts with trade unions or employees (Stiebale 
& Trax, 2011). The new management can indeed more easily renegotiate explicit and implicit labor contracts 
and conditions because it is generally less committed to employees. On the other hand, target firms can benefit 
from acquiring competitive advantages and sales network, resulting in an increase in sales and employment. If 
for example the new ownership brings new capital inflows and expertise, the effect on the employment is likely 
to be positive. Motivation may also play a role as mergers which are motivated by profit maximization are 
more likely to be followed by cost savings and workforce reductions compared to mergers that are differently 
motivated. Effects on the workforce may also differ according to the type of merger as horizontal mergers – 
where firms operate in the same or similar industry – are more likely to lead to higher employment losses – as 
some functions can turn out to be redundant – even more if considering in a context of increasing returns to 
scale. Therefore, predictions about effects of M&A on employment are difficult. Similarly, the evidence of 
cross border M&A on the level of employment of acquired firms is somewhat mixed. If some authors (Harris 
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et alt. 2005) report an increase of productivity after ownership changes partly due to a layoff of workers, other 
studies (Arndt and Mattes 2010, Gugler and Yortoglu 2004) observe no evidence of workforce reduction in 
acquired firms. However, what empirical works tend to suggest is a tendency towards decrease or no change 
in employment, in line with efficiency increase and cost rationalization motives driving cross border M&A. 
1.3 Identification strategy  
 
Difference-in-Difference Matching (DiDM): estimating the ATT 
To overcome the selection bias problem, i.e. cross border M&A target firms are different from non-target firms, 
the study adopts a matching approach, by comparing only firms with ex-ante similar characteristics (purely 
domestic firms form the control group). This is to be done by using a Difference-in-Difference Matching 
(DiDM) Estimator, which allows to take into account both ex-ante differences in observed firm characteristics 
and temporally invariant differences in outcome levels, i.e. firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. Foreign target 
(treatment) and not target (control) firms are matched and compared on the basis of a propensity score (PS), 
which is defined as the probability of treatment (T) assignment conditional on observed baseline covariates 𝑿 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin,1983).  
𝑷𝑺(𝑿) = 𝑷𝒓[𝑻 = 𝟏|𝑿] 














To match treated and untreated subjects with similar scores, several matching algorithms can be used3. In this 
work, matching will be realized according to the three most commonly used matching algorithms: 3-Nearest 
neighbour with replacement4, 5-Nearest neighbour with replacement5 and Radius6.With the three underlying 
assumptions – conditional independence7, common support and balancing – holding, the analysis will able to 
 
3 Exact matching, Nearest neighbour, Radius matching, Stratification matching, Kernel matching, Weighting function 
4 Every treated is matched with three untreated and untreated individuals can be used only once as a match. 
5 Every treated is matched with five untreated and untreated individuals can be used only once as a match. 
6 Every treated is matched with untreated individuals that lies within the caliper (‘propensity range’). 
7     A sensitivity test, following the Rosenbaum bounds approach, will allow to determine how strongly an unmeasured 
confounding variable affects selection into treatment and undermine the results from the matching analysis. 
𝑾𝒊𝒋 denotes the weight given to the j − th case in making the comparison with the i − th treated case ( 0 <  Wji  1)   
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mimic a randomized assignment and, conditioning on the propensity score, unbiased estimates of the impact 
will be obtained.  
As previously mentioned, firms are matched conditioned on a propensity score, which, in this study, correspond 
to the firm’s probability of foreign acquisition; according to the existing literature (Arnold J. and Javorcik B. 
2009, Bertrand and Zitouna 2008, Blonigen A. and Pierce R. 2016, Heyman et al. 2007, Schiffbauer et al 2009, 
Siedschlag I. e Ruane F. 2009, Stiebale & Trax, 2011), the main variables that affect this probability are found 
to be: firm’s size (revenues, employees or market share), productivity (TFP or labour productivity), 
profitability (EBITDA or profit per employee), experience (age), skilled labour (labour cost per employee or 
wage), intangible capital (intangible fixed assets over total assets) and financial soundness (debts or interest 
expenses over total assets, cash flow over borrowing costs or solvency status)8. Also, external characteristics 
such as firm sector and its geographical location are likely to affect the probability to be acquired, as cross-
border investors prefer to target firms located in certain areas and sectors.  
Therefore, to obtain the propensity score, the treatment status dummy (being acquired by a foreign firm) is 
regressed on the selected baseline characteristics using a logit model. Estimated propensity scores represent 
predicted probabilities of treatment, on which basis similar subjects - belonging to the same 2-digit NACE 
sector - will be matched and their outcomes compared. The variables selected for the estimation of the 
propensity score equation are the following: 
Table 1.1. Baseline variables for the estimation of the propensity score  
Variable name Description 
Revenues 0_1  From 0 to 1 ml € of revenues 
Revenues 1_2  From 1 to 2 ml € of revenues 
Revenues 2_10 From 2 to 10 ml € of revenues 
Revenues 10_50  From 10 to 50 ml € of revenues 
Revenues 50 Over 50 ml € of revenues 
Value added per employee Value added per employee 
Profit per employee  Profit per employee 
Age Years of business 
Labour cost per employee Labour cost per employee  
Intangible Capital Intangible fixed assets over total assets 
Leverage Debts over total assets 
Area North-Central Italy vs South-Islands Italy 
 
The combination of matching and a difference-in-differences approach means looking for divergence in the 
paths of performance between the target and matched control firms with similar characteristics in the pre-
acquisition year. For this reason, it becomes important to check any differences in pre-acquisition trends which 
may drive change in performance over the years following the acquisition; this is done by testing the so-called 
 
8  For the full set of variables affecting the probability to be acquired by a foreign investor please see annex 1. 
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Common Trend hypothesis, which guarantees that treatment and control groups had similar trajectories in the 
outcome variables before the acquisition. 
1.4 Data description  
To conduct the empirical analysis, an integrated dataset has been constructed by combining two different 
databases on foreign investments, Reprint by Ice and Politecnico di Milano – a Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) data bank which provides information on the identity of Italian multinational and foreign-owned firms 
and their foreign subsidiaries - and Zephyr by Bureau van Dijk – a financial information inventory which 
provides data on M&A deals and rumors across the world, with a third database AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata 
Delle Aziende) – a company accounts data system that contains classified balance sheets of more than 700.000 
Italian firms - provided by Bureau van Dijk. 
Data have been collected for all Italian firms who have been subject to cross-border M&A deals between the 
years 2010 to 2013 – using as source both Reprint and Zephyr in a complementary way to obtain a more 
complete list of cross border M&A targeting Italy. However, a firm in order to be included in this M&A target 
firms group must have been acquired by a foreign investor, that is the M&A deal would give a foreign investor 
a control share (≥ 50%). The resulting group would have summed up to 1155 firms acquired between 2010 
and 2013 by a foreign investor, but unfortunately over half of these firms could not been included (table 2) in 
the study because they displayed non-positive or missing value on relevant variables such as -  value of 
production, value added, revenues, employees and fixed capital - in the year prior and 1-year after the deal. 
That has turned unfeasible the calculation of the outcome variable (TFP) and some baseline variables – 
specifically the ones expressed in per capita terms, such as value added, profit and labour cost per employee. 
Thus, the study has been able to guarantee a coverage of 53% with respect with the original sample, totaling 
612 firms, that represent the ‘treatment’ group.  
Table 1.2. Number of firms subject to cross-border M&A between 2010 and 2013 with foreign control (≥ 50%)  
 2013 2012 2011 2010        2013-2010 
Treated firms 218 168 126 100 612 
Cross-border M&A 
target firms 362 270 318 205 1155 
treated/target firms 60% 62% 40% 49% 53% 
 
Next, a group of domestic firms with similar ex-ante characteristics must be selected to form the comparison 
group. To serve the purpose a panel of firms has been randomly extracted from AIDA, totaling 75983 units for 
the four years (almost 20.000 a year), with the constraint of belonging to the same sector (4-digit Nace rev.2) 
of the acquired firms. Plus, in order to guarantee an extensive comparison group, for each firm in the treatment 
group must have corresponded at least 30 firms of the same sector from the control group.  
 
Table 1.3. Number of domestic non-target firms, between 2010 and 2013  
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 2013 2012 2011 2010        2013-2010 




A first visual comparison is provided by Graph 1.1, that plots the distribution by industry, class size, status and 
geographical area of the two pooled groups of firms (2010-2013), the first includes 29.843 non-target firms9 
while the second 612 target firms, for the year prior to the foreign acquisition (‘baseline’ year). Despite non-
target firms have been selected according to the sector of origin of treated firms, the two groups show some 
differences in relation to the industry, as there are more firms belonging to construction and trade sectors in 
the control group compared to the treatment group, which is due to the random extraction of non-target firms. 
A notable difference between the groups is also in terms of revenues size: target firms tend to be bigger than 
purely domestic firms, according to theory this can be explained by the fact that cross-border deals tend to 
target larger firms due to high information asymmetries and transaction costs involved in the transaction. In 
relation to the geographical location of the registered office, target M&A firms tend to be located more in North 
of Italy compared to non-target ones. The last figure shows that target firms are older compared to non-target, 
this was expected since M&A usually involves more experienced domestic firms (although 22 target firms are 
considered start-up as they have less than 2 year when they were acquired). 
Graphs 1.2a in the appendix show some additional differences in pre-acquisition characteristics. For instance, 
target firms display higher levels of labour cost per capita compared to non-target, signaling the presence of 
more skilled workers in acquired firms. Along with skilled labour, target firms seem to own more intangible 
capital (over total capital) as the distribution of the variable is more shifted rightward. Again, target firms show 
higher labour productivity levels compared to purely domestic ones, as distribution of the variable for treated 
units is moved eastward compared to control units. While the level of leverage is rather similar in both groups, 
the distribution of profit per capita show more kurtosis around lower values for not-target units, most likely 
due to the larger presence of micro and small firms. Last but not the least the legal status, more purely domestic 
firms are - to date 2019 - out of business or in liquidation, indicating a higher chance of survival of acquired 






9 46140 out of 75983 non-target firms record either missing or non-positive values (for the variable production, value 
added, revenues, employees and fixed capital), thereby Propensity Score could not be calculated for those firms. 
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Graph 1.1 – Distribution by industry, class size, status and geographical area of non-target and target groups – 





To perform correct inference, it is of utmost importance to analyze the main characteristics of not included 
target firms (appendix - graphs 1.4a). Looking and comparing those graphs with graphs 1.1a, it is possible to 
notice very few differences between not included and included target firms. Not included firms are indeed very 
similar to included firms both in terms of geographic area (predominantly Center and North firms), industry 
(mostly from manufacturing, other and trade sectors) and status (over three quarters are in business). However, 
there is still a notable difference with respect to firms’ age: 134 out of 534 not included firms (over 25%) are 
start-up, i.e. with less than 2 years old at the moment of the acquisition - contrary to 3,5% of included target 
firms, and that in part can explained the lack of information or presence non-positive values in this group of 
firms. 
To end the section, it can be interesting to look at the main characteristics of Italian firms subject to cross 
border deals between 2010 and 2013 and compare them to their relative Western European and North American 
counterparts, as the database Zephyr allows worldwide comparisons among cross border M&A deals. With 
regard to industry, there are not notable differences as the main destination sectors are: Machinery and 
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equipment, Other services, Chemicals and non-metallic products, Metal products and Food & Beverage. The 
Utility sectors is maybe the only exception as it represents 9% of Italian deals, but less than 1% of Western 
European and North American deals. In general, the average deal value is higher for Italian firms - 211 
thousand euros compared to 180 thousand euros – as well as their average productivity (revenues/employees) 
– 1244 euros compared to 719 euros. On the contrary, European and American firms are larger in size - 429 
employees per firm against 230 employees per firm of Italian firms. Last but not the least, M&A target firms 
do not differ in terms of their stock exchange listing status, in fact only 1% of both Italian and Western 
European/North American firms were issuing shares the year prior to the acquisition.   
1.5 Results  
As a first step, the probability of being acquired by a foreign firm is estimated using a logit model. Table 1.4 
presents the result of the logit model coming from equation 1. 
Almost all binary dummies concerning revenues are significant at least at 0.05 significance level: the higher 
the revenues the higher the chance for a firm to be acquired by a foreign investor, which means that target 
firms are bigger in size. Area and intangible capital are also always significant at 0.05 level, suggesting that 
M&A target firms are usually located in North and Central Italy and have higher level of intangible capital. In 
three years out of four there is not significant difference in terms of age, only in 2011 acquired firms are 
younger compare to not acquired ones. Acquired firms are found to be less profitable only in year 2010, while 
they do not show significant difference in terms of productivity. Lastly, in some years (2010 and 2011) the 
probability of being acquired by a foreign investor increases if firms employ more skilled workers (have higher 
labour cost per employee). 
What has been found confirm the cherry-picking hypothesis which states that investors target the most solid 
and structured companies (larger dimension, higher level of intangible capital and skilled labour), typically 
located in the more dynamic areas. 
Table 1.4. Logit model: probability of being acquired in the years 2010 to 2013 using previous year baseline 
variables 
 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Variable Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Revenues 1_2  0.8232 0.011** 0.8648 0.025** 0.5338 0.243 1.9123 0.002*** 
Revenues 2_10 1.9930 0.000*** 2.1025 0.000*** 1.5245 0.000*** 2.8849 0.000*** 
Revenues 10_50  2.9009 0.000*** 3.1474 0.000*** 2.3637 0.000*** 4.3020 0.000*** 
Revenues 50 3.6192 0.000*** 3.6097 0.000*** 3.2224 0.000*** 4.6697 0.000*** 
Value added per 
employee 0.0002 0.616 0.0002 0.282 -0.0016 0.083* 0.0002 0.765 
Profit per 
employee  0.0003 0.475 0.0001 0.793 -0.0001 0.395 -0.0012 0.000*** 
Labour cost per 
employee 0.0000 0.922 0.0014 0.324 0.00909 0.001*** 0.0036 0.056* 
Age -0.0027 0.556 0.0057 0.297 -0.0181 0.008** -0.0025 0.734 
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Intangible Capital 1.2031 0.000*** 1.2949 0.000*** 1.2751 0.000*** 1.6115 0.000*** 
Leverage -0.0006 0.576 -0.0020 0.163 -0.0001 0.888 -0.0035 0.007*** 
Area 1.2659 0.000*** 1.2533 0.001*** 0.7651 0.043** 1.1969 0.010** 
_cons -6.9337 0.000*** -7.4216 0.000*** -5.9799 0.000*** -7.8637 0.000*** 
 
PSM provides a very effective and robust method for estimating the effect of foreign acquisition only if 
covariates are balanced in the two groups of firms, i.e. acquired and non-acquired ones. The balancing 
assumption means that the control group (non-acquired firms) has a distribution of covariates very similar to 
the treatment group (acquired firms). The significance level taken into consideration to prove similarity 
between the two groups is 0.05 (**). The table below shows which covariates are not properly balanced: only 
Revenues_50 and Revenues0_1 are found to be unbalanced – respectively in 2011 and 2010 - at 95% 
confidence level. Once data are pooled in a single dataset, which spans from 2010 to 2013, again the variable 
Revenues_50 is not properly balanced; a higher presence of larger firms in the treatment group can be clearly 
seen in Annex 3, which shows the distribution of baseline variables – by reporting also their mean values - for 
treatment and target groups. However, joint chi square distributions are always balanced, which allows to claim 
that the balance property is satisfied across the years. The common support assumption – which states that 
every subject has a nonzero probability to receive either treatment – is also guaranteed (see graphs in Annex 
5).  
Table 1.5. Comparison between treatment and control group (p values), 1-year before baseline covariates  
 NN5 
Variable 2013 2012 2011 2010 
2010-
2013 
Revenues 0_1  0.659 0.378 0.141 
0.046*
* 0.069* 
Revenues 1_2  0.94 0.75 0.656 0.337 0.936 
Revenues 2_10 0.291 0.159 0.208 0.403 0.071* 
Revenues 10_50  0.768 0.565 0.75 0.245 0.382 
Revenues 50 0.151 0.097* 0.026** 0.178 
0.013*
* 
Value added per 
employee 0.531 0.642 0.385 0.495 0.258 
Profit per employee  
0.867 0.186 0.853 0.937 0.492 
Labour cost per 
employee  0.111 0.139 0.845 0.152 0.143 
Age 
0.093** 0.117 0.712 0.656 0.826 
Intangible Capital 
0.577 0.697 0.188 0.251 0.453 
Leverage 
0.931 0.895 0.823 0.849 0.900 
Area 
0.92 0.615 0.776 0.895 0.655 
Agriculture 1.000 . 1.000 . 1.000 
Manufacturing 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1.000 
1.000 





Construction 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Transportation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tourism 1.000 1.000 . 1.000 1.000 
Other services 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p>chi2 0.992 0.403 0.831 0.892 0.493 
 
The second step of this analysis implies merging the four different datasets, one for each year, in a new single 
dataset (pooled sample), and carry out a weighted regression. The weights (pweights) for control group depend 
on the type of algorithm chosen. For this study a 5-Nearest neighbour algorithm has been selected, which 
involves that each acquired firm is matched with five not-acquired firms - from the same 2-digit NACE sector10 
- and not-acquired firms can be used only once as a match. 
Then, the effect of a cross border M&A is estimated on TFP11 and employment on the 5 years following the 
deal, because as suggested by theory effects of acquisition are likely to be different over time (eq 2).  
Δ𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 [𝒑𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔]  
where: 
𝒊 = firm 
𝐭 = 0 to 5  
 
∆𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 = log(𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒕) − log( 𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝟎) 
 
Before implementing a difference-in-differences estimate, as a robustness check, a one-year common trend 
(CT) assumption is tested using pre-treatment data, which helps to understand whether the two groups had 
different trajectories in the outcome variables before the acquisition. If so, any post acquisition effect on 
outcome could be attributed not only to the acquisition, but to the different pre-acquisition outcome paths. As 
it is shown in table 1.6, outcome variable growth is not different between the two groups 
(Δoutcome0year_CT12) leading to reject the role of difference in pre-acquisition outcome growth on post-
acquisition firms’ performance13. 
As demonstrated by theory, short- and long-term effect of foreign acquisition may differ and this study 
confirms this intuition. The table below shows different effects through time for both productivity (TFP) and 
employment both for Unmatched - left hand side - and PSM Matched – right hand side – samples. Not only in 
 
10   This is done by using the following matching algorithm: NEWps=NACERev2_2cif*10000+OLDps*1000 
11  Derived from a Cobb-Douglas value added production function estimation with Levinsohn-Petrin correction (see 
annex 6). 
12    Δoutcome0year_CT= log(outcome0year)-log(outcome-1year) 




the unmatched case, but also in the matched one, positive and significant coefficients are found for TFP starting 
from the third year. Target firms are more efficient than purely domestic firms by 12,7% in the third year after 
the acquisition, 11,5% in the fourth and 11,9% in the fifth year, so with a significant impact in the third year 
which slightly declines over the following years14. What can be concluded is that, from 2010 to 2013, Italian 
target firms have benefitted from the change of ownership, which means that the efficiency gains stemming 
from cross-border M&A deals – such as technological transfer, better managerial and organizational practices, 
a more efficient reallocation of production across firms or the presence of scale economies – have offset their 
potential disadvantages – such as loose management, lower coordination or technology sourcing. An 
alternative explanation to the productivity delta between target and purely domestic firms takes into account 
market power, since the standard calculation of tfp (Olley and Pakes 1996, Levinsohn and Petrin 2003) does 
not allow to disentangle between efficiency and market power effects, as pointed out by Bloningen and Pierce 
(2016). However, an additional analysis to disentangle the two different effects is out of the scope of the present 
study, thus left for future research. 
Across the sample, no significant effect of foreign acquisition on 1-year post acquisition performance is found. 
However, this is not an isolated case: a study realized by Schiffbauer et al. (2009), which examine UK target 
firms over the period 1999-2007, even finds a 1-year post-acquisition negative effect on their TFP. The absence 
of significant effect in the short-run can be either explained by the occurrence reorganization and 
restructuration costs target firms may bear right after the acquisition or by the presence of lead time in the 
reorganization of activities after the M&A. While the latter channel cannot be tested with the data at hands, 
the former effect should be somehow visible from the balance sheet when measuring the cost of goods sold 
across the years after the acquisition. Having a look at intermediate goods costs (raw material and other 
expenditures), which is just a part of the cost of goods sold, may provide some clues on the absence of 
productivity effect in the first year. However, table 1.7a (in annex 7) reports no significant difference in the 
cost of intermediate goods between the two groups.  
Another explanation to the absence of short run effects fact can be found in Maksimovic et al, (2011), which 
by analyzing US plants, find that half of the plants, which resulted to be the least productive, were sold or 
closed within 3 year from the acquisition, while the retained ones turned out to be also the most productive 
ones. The same may have occurred in this study as sample size tends to decrease as time goes by, as shown in 
table 1.6 (right-hand column). 
Table 1.6. Effect of cross-border M&A deals on target Italian firms’ performance, from 2010 to 2013 (NN5) 
 Unmatched  Matched 




.0030129 .029024 0.10 0.917 -.006439 .0304371 -0.21 0.832  
1869 
 




-.016912 .0257545 -0.66 0.511  .0107885 .0325086 0.33 0.740 
2622 
Δtfp2year 
.0501132 .0286646 1.75 0.080* .0637727 .0340643 1.87 0.061* 
2471 
Δtfp3year .0730933 .0300771 2.43 0.015** .1271913 .0357704 3.56 0.000***  2404 
Δtfp4year 
.0843078 .0308048 2.74 0.006*** .1150813 .0406269 2.83 0.005*** 
2293 
Δtfp5year 
.1188843 .0400286 2.97 0.003*** .1188843 .0400286 2.97 0.003***  
2199 
Δemployees0year_CT 
.0297448 .0194025 1.53 0.125 .0094667 .0228601 0.41 0.679 
1884 
Δemployees1year 
.0170746 .0167543 1.02 0.308 .004125 .0177508 0.23 0.816 
2622 
Δemployees2year 
.0484286 .0218323 2.22 0.027**  .0315088 .0237012 1.33 0.184  
2530 
Δemployees3year 
.085871 .0253311 3.39 0.001***  .0769344 .0310332 2.48 0.013** 
2476 
Δemployees4year 
.096378 .0281995 3.42 0.001*** .0980961 .0345186 2.84 0.005*** 
2379 
Δemployees5year 
.1270011 .0301272 4.22 0.000*** .1230363 .0383065 3.21 0.001*** 
2289 
 
M&A deals can provide to foreign investors the opportunity to cancel contracts with trade unions or dismiss 
redundant employees. That is the reason why these economic deals are constantly under public scrutiny. In this 
research however, there is no evidence of layoff of workers, but quite the contrary: acquired firms report a 
statistically significant increase in workforce - compared to non-acquired firms – in the three years after the 
acquisition, starting from the third and with an increasing pace. The delta between the two groups is found to 
be 7,7% in the third year, 9,8% in the third year and 12,3%15 in the fifth year. Thus, the evidence suggests that 
acquired firms - in the case of Italy - benefit also from an increase in employment, potentially due to the 
competitive advantages and sales network expansion brought by the newly arrived foreign investors. 
As a final step, a sensitivity test (Rosenbaum bounds) to investigate whether the causal effect estimated from 
the Propensity Score matching is vulnerable to the influence of unobserved covariates is run. As reported in 
table 1.8a in Annex 8, in the third year after the acquisition the estimated effect on TFP is insensitive to a bias 
that would increase the odds of treatment by 20% but sensitive to a bias that would increase them by 30%. It 
is possible to conclude that the analysis on the effect of cross-border M&A on firms’ productivity is only 
partially sensitive to hidden bias. The impact on employment - estimated at its most in the fifth year - is even 
less sensitive to the influence of unobserved covariates, in fact a bias that increases the odds of treatment by 
40% wouldn’t affect the results, as shown by table 1.8b. 
1.6 Robustness checks 
As further check on the existence of a significant impact of cross-border M&A deals on acquired firms’ 
productivity and employment, alternative matching algorithms, specifications, samples and outcome variables 
are tested within the same identification framework (Difference in Difference Matching).  
 
15   Which corresponds to a delta of 2566 units of workforce increase (in the fifth year after the acquisition).  
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To make sure results do not depend on the matching algorithm employed (NN5), two alternative matching 
algorithms are tested, namely Nearest Neighbor 3 (NN3) - which is a one-to-one matching - and radius - which 
is a radius matching that uses a standard caliper of 0.013828. As shown below, results are robust to the use of 
different matching algorithms, as both outcome variables are significant and positive in the long term. In both 
NN3 and radius, the effect on TFP is greatest in the third year, as for baseline results (NN3); the effect on 
employment is also in this case increasing through years, though a bit smaller when NN3 is applied. The 
balancing property is satisfied across the years (see Annex 9). 
Table 1.7. Effect of cross-border M&A deals on target Italian firms’ performance, from 2010 to 2013 (NN3 & 
Radius) 
 NN3 
 Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Sample 
Size 
Δtfp0year_CT  -.0086747 .0318534 -0.27 0.785  1362 
Δtfp1year .0071684 .0333686 0.21 0.830  1877 
Δtfp2year .0699492 .0353914 1.98 0.048** 1776 
Δtfp3year .1163052 .0365049 3.19 0.001*** 1734 
Δtfp4year .109622 .0416069 2.63 0.008*** 1654 
Δtfp5year .1052526 .0402352 2.62 0.009*** 1557 
Δemployees0year_CT .0070376 .0224331 0.31 0.754  1375 
Δemployees1year .0008589 .018852 0.05 0.964  1877 
Δemployees2year .0280876 .0251969 1.11 0.265  1810 
Δemployees3year .071069 .0324395 2.19 0.029** 1774 
Δemployees4year .084649 .0349558 2.42 0.016**  1706 
Δemployees5year .1097496 .0392041 2.80 0.005*** 1638 
 
 RADIUS 
 Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Sample 
Size 
Δtfp0year_CT  -.0120354 .0331846 -0.36 0.717  9627 
Δtfp1year .0162261 .0354221 0.46 0.647  14457 
Δtfp2year .0599006 .037929 1.58 0.114  13293 
Δtfp3year .1002508 .0379626 2.64 0.008*** 12598 
Δtfp4year .1069621 .0430561 2.48 0.013** 11892 
Δtfp5year .0777739 .0424062 1.83 0.067*  11265 
Δemployees0year_CT .0156444 .022013 0.71 0.477 9774 
Δemployees1year .0174553 .0196667 0.89 0.375  14457 
Δemployees2year .0599026 .0288158 2.08 0.038** 13745 
Δemployees3year .1017086 .0344413 2.95 0.003*** 13128 
Δemployees4year .1006905 .0394188 2.55 0.011** 12423 




The first alternative specification does not include the variable value added per employee among baseline 
variables – which explain the probability of being acquired by a foreign investor. This attempt is to avoid 
considering a variable - that approximates the outcome (TFP) - in the propensity score equation16. As shown 
below, results are robust to the exclusion of value added per capita, as both outcome variables are significant 
and positive starting from the third year, in line with main results. The balancing property is satisfied across 
the years (see Annex 9). 
Table 1.8. Effect of cross-border M&A deals on target Italian firms’ performance, from 2010 to 2013 (NN5 











In a similar way, it is possible to rule out the variable labour cost per employee among baseline variables; this 
again in order not to include a variable that could be ex-ante correlated with one of the outcome (in this case 
employees). As it can be seen in table 1.9c, the impact on the outcome variables is even anticipated, manifesting 
its effect from the second year on. The balancing property is satisfied across the years (see Annex 9). 
Table 1.9. Effect of cross-border M&A deals on target Italian firms’ performance, from 2010 to 2013 (NN5 
without labour cost per employee) 
 
16 This is also why TFP has not been used in the propensity score equation. 
 Matched 
 Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Δtfp0year_CT  -.0116188 .0310165 -0.37 0.708  
Δtfp1year .0046641 .0325984 0.14 0.886  
Δtfp2year .0492451 .0340776 1.45 0.149 
Δtfp3year .1077048 .0352292 3.06 0.002**  
Δtfp4year .1045571 .040685 2.57 0.010**  
Δtfp5year .1097058 .040094 2.74 0.006**  
Δemployees0year_CT .0190639 .0229497 0.83 0.406  
Δemployees1year .0017826 .017852 0.10 0.920 
Δemployees2year .0261115 .0236436 1.10 0.270 
Δemployees3year .0664377 .0311092 2.14 0.033**  
Δemployees4year .0824794 .0345901 2.38 0.017** 
Δemployees5year .1095647 .0385836 2.84 0.005*** 
 Matched 
 Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Δtfp0year_CT  .0089609 .0285581 0.31 0.754 
Δtfp1year -.0114142 .0253534 -0.45 0.653 
Δtfp2year .0509219 .0282585 1.80 0.072* 
Δtfp3year .0716665 .0294539 2.43 0.015** 
Δtfp4year .083261 .0303185 2.75 0.006** 







A third robustness check is done with the goal of obtaining a better balance between the two groups through 
the exclusion of less relevant industries. In the treatment group, indeed, only few firms operate in the following 
sectors: agriculture (4 units), tourism (8 units) e waste (7 units). Again, in this case results are robust and 
positive and significant effects are confirmed for both TFP and employment. The balancing property is satisfied 
across the years (see Annex 9). 
Table 1.10. Effect of cross-border M&A deals on target Italian firms’ performance, from 2010 to 2013 (NN5 
excluding less relevant industries) 
 Matched 
 Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Δtfp0year_CT  -.0107362 .0313867 -0.34 0.732  
Δtfp1year -.0044271 .0330106 -0.13 0.893 
Δtfp2year .0654491 .0346772 1.89 0.059*  
Δtfp3year .1428119 .0363137 3.93 0.000*** 
Δtfp4year .1246173 .040507 3.08 0.002*** 
Δtfp5year .1252971 .0410294 3.05 0.002***  
Δemployees0year_CT .0219892 .022699 0.97 0.333 
Δemployees1year -.0013844 .0172944 -0.08 0.936  
Δemployees2year .0263305 .0237279 1.11 0.267 
Δemployees3year .0626869 .0314964 1.99 0.047**  
Δemployees4year .0849234 .0353465 2.40 0.016** 
Δemployees5year .1024407 .0389383 2.63 0.009*** 
 
An additional sample specification involves dropping from the control group firms that have been subject to 
national M&A. In this way, only domestic firms not subject to any kind of M&A are included in the control 
group. Results are still positive and significant for both TFP and employment, although the effect on TFP is 
slightly less intense with respect to the original sample. The balancing property is satisfied across the years 
(see Annex 9). 
Table 1.11. Effect of cross-border M&A deals on target Italian firms’ performance, from 2010 to 2013 (NN5 
excluding national M&A) 
 Matched 
 Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Δtfp0year_CT  .0186907 .0324027 0.58 0.564  
Δemployees0year_CT .0260678 .018749 1.39 0.164  
Δemployees1year .0223513 .0166446 1.34 0.179 
Δemployees2year .0540298 .0215818 2.50 0.012** 
Δemployees3year .0831717 .0249176 3.34 0.001*** 
Δemployees4year .0977446 .0278255 3.51 0.000*** 
Δemployees5year .1293793 .0298895 4.33 0.000***  
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Δtfp1year -.0236917 .0347318 -0.68 0.495  
Δtfp2year .0448943 .0360944 1.24 0.214  
Δtfp3year .1036349 .0370995 2.79 0.005*** 
Δtfp4year .0966972 .0427252 2.26 0.024** 
Δtfp5year .08715 .0415887 2.10 0.036**  
Δemployees0year_CT .0062994 .0236648 0.27 0.790  
Δemployees1year .010772 .0190219 0.57 0.571  
Δemployees2year .0517631 .0253899 2.04 0.042** 
Δemployees3year .0932977 .0315106 2.96 0.003***  
Δemployees4year .0895282 .0366172 2.44 0.015**  
Δemployees5year .120296 .0409059 2.94 0.003*** 
 
When considering multiple-years effect on outcome – such as TFP – one can think that the impact on some 
particular year – for instance from the third year on, as in the present study – may be due to the different size 
of both treat and control groups, as some firms go out of business as time goes by. In particular, the graph on 
status in the appendix may suggest that there are more control firms going out of business compared to treated 
ones. Thereby in this alternative sample only firms running at least five years of business after the acquisition 
(with positive TFP for five consecutive years) are considered. Here as well results are positive and significant 
both for TFP and employment, although also in this case the effect on TFP is smaller compared to the baseline 
sample. Again, the balancing property is satisfied across the years (see Annex 9). 
Table 1.12. Effect of cross-border M&A deals on target Italian firms’ performance, from 2010 to 2013 (NN5 
only 5-years operating firms) 
 Matched 
 Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Δtfp0year_CT  -.0078012 .0299791 -0.26 0.795 
Δtfp1year -.015421 .0317005 -0.49 0.627  
Δtfp2year .0372811 .0328648 1.13 0.257  
Δtfp3year .0983844 .0365982 2.69 0.007***  
Δtfp4year .0986217 .0361024 2.73 0.006*** 
Δtfp5year .0884278 .0400025 2.21 0.027** 
Δemployees0year_CT -.0098116 .0235292 -0.42 0.677 
Δemployees1year .0075155 .0161355 0.47 0.641 
Δemployees2year .0292425 .0227755 1.28 0.199  
Δemployees3year .072308 .0285027 2.54 0.011** 
Δemployees4year .1030502 .0302958 3.40 0.001*** 
Δemployees5year .133181 .0350965 3.79 0.000*** 
 
Lastly, an alternative outcome variable to TFP is considered, labour productivity – value added per employee 
– which still measures firms’ efficiency but in a different way, taking into consideration also variation in 
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employment level. Similar to TFP, the effect on labour productivity is statistically significant starting from the 
third year, even if smaller in terms of impact size. Not surprisingly, the effect on revenues is also positive and 
significant in the long term, that can explain the increase in TFP and employment in the medium term.  
Table 1.13. Effect of cross-border M&A deals on target Italian firms’ performance, from 2010 to 2013 (NN5 
with labour productivity as outcome variable) 
 PSM Matched 
 Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Δvaperempl0year_CT -.0093001 .0329952 -0.28 0.778 
Δvaperempl1year .0031056 .0341126 0.09 0.927 
Δvaperempl2year .05487 .0349127 1.57 0.116 
Δvaperempl3year .0986523 .0371082 2.66 0.008***  
Δvaperempl4year .0902031 .0419032 2.15 0.031** 
Δvaperempl5year .0883441 .0426098 2.07 0.038** 
Δrevenues1year .0206642 .028263 0.73 0.465 
Δrevenues2year .0746847 .0345979 2.16 0.031** 
Δrevenues3year .1437452 .0406283 3.54 0.000*** 
Δrevenues4year .186091 .0491441 3.79 0.000***  
Δrevenues5year .2246176 .0550506 4.08 0.000*** 
 
1.7 Conclusions 
The flow of inward Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) has increased starting from the 1990’s all over the world 
bringing wide-ranging socio-economic implications. There are two different foreign market entry modes 
(greenfield or M&A) and this research has decided to focus on one of them - cross-border M&A deals - to 
understand their effect on host country target firms’ performance.  
Following the industrial organization literature, the study aims at disentangling between short-term and long-
term effects of cross-border M&A on target firms’ productivity (TFP) and employment, looking at the Italian 
case between the years 2010 and 2013. Target firms however cannot be directly compared to purely domestic 
firms because they have different pre-acquisition characteristics that, other than attracting the interest of 
foreign investors, have a direct impact on post-acquisition performance. To overcome this selection bias - 
which would have produced biased estimates, a Difference-in-Difference Matching (DiDM) approach is 
followed. 
As a first step the Propensity Score Matching procedure in implemented: as expected there is self-selection in 
becoming a cross border M&A target, as target and non-target firms differ in some pre-acquisition 
characteristics. In particular, foreign investors tend to cherry-pick target firms, which are found to be larger in 
size, employing more skilled workers, located in the more dynamic areas and with higher intangible capital. 
This can be explained by the strategic motives behind the decision to acquire or merge with an international 
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company, instead of making a greenfield investment, such as acquiring foreign firm’s local knowledge or 
eliminate a potential competitor. 
Then a weighted pooled regression is carried out to measure the impact of cross-border M&A deals on target 
Italian firms’ performance. What results show is a positive and significant long-term effect of ownership 
change on both efficiency and employment. From 2010 to 2013, Italian firms have benefitted from foreign 
ownership in terms of productivity – the delta to purely domestic firms 12,7% in the third year after the 
acquisition, 11,5% in the fourth and 11,9% in the fifth year. This result is in line with the profit maximizing 
hypothesis, which states that investors acquire foreign firms to realize efficiency gains – and well as increase 
their market power - through a more efficient reallocation of production across firms, the exploitation of 
economies of scale or scope, the sourcing of technological knowledge and the transfer of managerial and 
organizational practices. The absence of positive significant effect in the short term can be due to: 
reorganization and restructuration costs, lead time in the reorganization of activities after the M&A or the 
presence of less productive firms which are sold within 2 years from the acquisition. The slightly declining 
intensity of the impact of cross border M&A deals on productivity suggests that positive synergies are fully 
reaped in one year - the third in this case – and then tend to decrease in intensity over time. However, it must 
be always bear in mind that there could be an alternative explanation of the productivity increase, that calls 
into play mark-ups. In fact, since the calculation of tfp does not allow to distinguish between productivity and 
market power, the above mentioned efficiency effect could be alternatively seen a mark-up increase. 
The effect of ownership change in terms of employment is also positive: the delta to purely domestic firms is 
7,7% in the third year, 9,8% in the third year and 12,3% in the fifth year. Although M&As provide an 
opportunity for the new management to cancel work contracts and renegotiate labor conditions, target firms in 
host countries can also benefit from acquirer’s competitive advantages, enlarged sales network and inflow of 
capital investments, which leads to an expansion of the business and an increase in employment. This is what 
is likely to be happened to Italian firms subject of cross border M&A over the years 2010-2013. Here again 
the positive effect is not immediate - no significant effect found in the first year after the acquisition – which 
can be explained by the time needed by a company to reorganizing its structure, select new employees and 
contract them. 
The results summarized above are robust to several robustness checks, which try to overcome the potential 
sources of bias, such as: algorithm chosen for matching, misspecification of the propensity score equation, 
inclusion of less relevant sectors, exclusion of national M&A target firms from the control group and the effect 






Annex 1.1. Variables list 
 
Table 1.1a. List of potential baseline variables for the estimation of the propensity score 
Dimension Variable References 
sector Two or three digit NACE industry 
levels 
Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 
Bertrand, O. & Zitouna, H. 
(2008)  
Report ICE Prometeia (2014) 
 
size Employees or net sales Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 
Report ICE Prometeia (2014) 
Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall 
(2007) 
Arnold J. and Javorcik B. 
(2009) 
Bentivogli & Mirenda (2019) 
 market share Bertrand, O. & Zitouna, H. 
(2008)  
 
labour productivity VA / employee Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 
total factor productivity TFP  
 
Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 
 
 Multilateral TFP Index 
 
(In Arnold J. and Javorcik B. TFP is 
used in level and growth in the PSM) 
Bertrand, O. & Zitouna, H. 
(2008)  
Arnold J. and Javorcik B. 
(2009)  
 
profitability profit per employee Report ICE Prometeia (2014) 
Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall 
(2007) 
 EBITDA Bertrand, O. & Zitouna, H. 
(2008)  
 Return on capital Or Return on equity Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 
experience Age, age-squared Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 
Blonigen A. and Pierce R. 
(2016) 
Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall 
(2007) 
skilled labour labour cost per employee Blonigen A. and Pierce R. 
(2016) 
 wage Bertrand, O. & Zitouna, H. 
(2008) 




Arnold J. and Javorcik B. 
(2009) 
 
 Skilled labour share Arnold J. and Javorcik B. 
(2009) 
Knowledge intensity intangible fixed assets over total assets Report ICE Prometeia (2014) 
Bentivogli & Mirenda (2019) 
 Capital labour ratio Blonigen A. and Pierce R. 
(2016) 
Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall 
(2007) 
Arnold J. and Javorcik B. 
(2009) 
Involvement in international trade Being exporter or not Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall 
(2007) 
Arnold J. and Javorcik B. 
(2009) 
 Imported input share Arnold J. and Javorcik B. 
(2009) 
financial soundness  debts over total assets Report ICE Prometeia (2014) 
Bentivogli & Mirenda (2019) 
 interest expenses over total assets Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 
 cash flow over borrowing costs Report ICE Prometeia (2014) 
 solvency status (solvent or not solvent) Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 
ownership status public or private  Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 
Arnold J. and Javorcik B. 
(2009) 
quoted Quoted or not Schiffbauer M., Siedschlag I. e 
Ruane F. (2009) 


















Annex 1.2. Distribution of additional variables for target and not-target firms 
 
Graphs 1.2a – Distribution by labour cost, intangible capital, added value per employee, leverage and profit 
per employee - one year before the acquisition – and legal status – to date 2019 – of not-target (0) and target 







Annex 1.3. Distribution of baseline variables – control (0) and treatment (1) 
group 
 
Graphs 1.3a – Distribution by area, size class, legal status (current), sector, labour cost, intangible capital, 
added value per employee, leverage and profit per employee - one year before the acquisition of control (0) 



















Table 1.3a – Mean values for the variables size class (Revenues 0_1, Revenues 1_2, Revenues 2_10, Revenues 
10_50, Revenues 50), added value per employee, profit per employee, labour cost per employee, age, 
intangible capital, leverage and sectors (Agriculture, Manufacturing, Waste, Construction, Trade, 









Revenues 0_1  
.06464    .09506 
Revenues 1_2  
.07034     .07161  
Revenues 2_10 
.31179    .36439   
Revenues 10_50  .34221    .31686  
Revenues 50 
.21103    .15209  
Value added per 
employee 
102.39    90.873  
Profit per employee  9.9517    13.086 
Labour cost per 
employee  
50.073    48.726  
Age  23.177     22.959 
Intangible Capital .26138    .24808  
Leverage 7.7205    7.9775  
Area .95247    .95817 
Agriculture 
.0038     .0038     
Manufacturing 
1.4259    1.4259 
Waste 
.03802    .03802  
Construction 
.14259    .14259    
Trade 
1.0266    1.0266  
Transportation .43916  .43916  
Tourism 
.13688     .13688  
Other services 





Annex 1.4. Main characteristics of not included target firms 
 
Graphs 1.4a – Distribution by area, type, sector, legal status (current) and age - one year before the acquisition 




















Annex 1.5. Common support 










Annex 1.6 Production function estimation using Levinsohn-Petrin approach 
In the year 2000, Levinsohn and Petrin built a structural approach to estimate TFP, based on the methodology 
developed by Olley and Pakes in 1996, by using intermediate inputs to solve the simultaneity issue in the 
production function estimation, which arises from the correlation between input levels and unobserved firm-
specific productivity shocks. This approach allows to overcome the estimation problem typically 
encountered by using the Olley and Pakes methodology, that is ignoring all observation with zero 
investment, since firms’ investment decision function must be strictly increasing in order to be inverted. 
So, Levinsohn and Petrin consider the production function 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where 𝑚𝑖𝑡 are intermediate inputs like material, fuel or electricity  
and 𝜔𝑖𝑡 are unobserved productivity shocks 
 
and assume that 𝑚𝑖𝑡 =  𝑓𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝜔𝑖𝑡) and 𝑓𝑡 is invertible and therefore  𝜔𝑖𝑡 =  𝑓𝑡
−1(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡).                     
After that, the estimation follows Olley-Pakes (1996) very closely by first regressing 𝑦𝑖𝑡  on 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and a non-
parametric estimate of 𝜃𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡) to get 𝛽?̂? and 𝜃𝑖?̂? , and after exploiting the conditional moment condition 
to recover 𝛽?̂? and 𝛽?̂?. 
In the present work, nominal variables have been deflated using the following ISTAT indices: agricultural 
price (for agriculture), 4 digit- production prices (for manufacturing), 2-digit services prices (for services), 
NIC (for retail and wholesale trade, food and accommodation), construction price (for construction), house 










Wald test of constant returns to scale: Chi2 = 458.55 (p = 0.0000).
                                                                                
l_realimmobmat     .0854632    .009961     8.58   0.000     .0659401    .1049863
  l_dipendenti     .6128262   .0103782    59.05   0.000     .5924853    .6331671
                                                                                
  l_realvalagg        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
Wald test of constant returns to scale: Chi2 = 362.36 (p = 0.0000).
                                                                                
l_realimmobmat     .0881793   .0113453     7.77   0.000      .065943    .1104156
  l_dipendenti     .6497337   .0099906    65.03   0.000     .6301525     .669315
                                                                                
  l_realvalagg        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Wald test of constant returns to scale: Chi2 = 612.12 (p = 0.0000).
                                                                                
l_realimmobmat     .0845169   .0062575    13.51   0.000     .0722524    .0967814
  l_dipendenti     .6834592   .0079576    85.89   0.000     .6678626    .6990558
                                                                                
  l_realvalagg        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Wald test of constant returns to scale: Chi2 = 1338.99 (p = 0.0000).
                                                                                
l_realimmobmat     .0816684   .0064394    12.68   0.000     .0690474    .0942893
  l_dipendenti      .669377   .0061217   109.35   0.000     .6573787    .6813752
                                                                                
  l_realvalagg        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Annex 1.7. Effect on intermediate goods 
 
Table 1.7a Effect of cross-border M&A deals on target Italian firms’ intermediate goods, from 2010 to 2013 
(NN5) 
 NN5 
 Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Δinter1year 7.581908 16.81654 0.45 0.652  
Δinter2year 3.24295 29.36342 0.11 0.912  
Δinter3year 6.742296 15.96722 0.42 0.673 
Δinter4year -4.756805 103.1897 -0.05 0.963 





Annex 1.8. Sensitivity test  
 
Table 1.8a Rosenbaum bounds for the effect on TFP 
Rosenbaum bounds for tfp3yeardiff (N = 504 matched pairs) 
     
    Gamma           sig+         sig-               t-hat+        t-hat-            CI+            CI- 
     
1 
.000807 .000807 .079012 .079012 .030105 .126436 
1.05 .003685 .000142 .067174 .091284 .018555 .138313 
1.1 .012888 .000022 .055824 .101783 .007226 .150126 
1.15 .035883 3.1e-06 .044966 .112111 -.004085 .161959 
1.2 .082154 3.9e-07 .034973 .122013 -.014226 .172851 
1.25 .159095 4.5e-08 .02513 .131418 -.024153 .182736 
1.3 .267157 4.7e-09 .01609 .14102 -.033662 .192126 
1.35 .397768 4.7e-10 .00691 .150527 -.042524 .200811 
1.4 .535821 4.4e-11 -.002336 .159986 -.050982 .209492 
1.45 .665211 3.9e-12 -.01051 .168995 -.059707 .218588 
1.5 .774049 3.3e-13 -.018467 .177085 -.067862 .227382 
1.55 .857081 2.6e-14 -.026309 .184969 -.076572 .235958 
1.6 .915064 2.0e-15 -.033847 .192292 -.084442 .244985 
1.65 .952428 1.1e-16 -.041006 .199229 -.092557 .253419 
1.7 .974806 0 -.047707 .206079 -.100488 .260961 
1.75 .987341 0 -.05429 .213006 -.108054 .268242 
1.8 .993945 0 -.061103 .220158 -.114809 .275672 
1.85 .997235 0 -.06762 .227204 -.121098 .282236 
1.9 .99879 0 -.074408 .233813 -.127446 .28867 
1.95 .999492 0 -.080599 .240661 -.134093 .295155 
2 .999794 0 -.087034 .247628 -.140309 .301908 
* gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
sig+   - upper bound significance level  
sig-   - lower bound significance level  
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 







Table 1.8b Rosenbaum bounds for the effect on employment 
 
Rosenbaum bounds for dipendenti5yeardiff (N = 513 matched pairs) 
     
    
 Gamma           sig+            sig-            t-hat+         t-hat-             CI+            CI- 
     
1 1.4e-06 1.4e-06 .123953 .123953 .072393 .176459 
1.05 .000013 1.2e-07 .111146 .136663 .060048 .189918 
1.1 .000085 8.9e-09 .099208 .148612 .048244 .203166 
1.15 .000435 6.2e-10 .087962 .160494 .036653 .215659 
1.2 .001759 4.0e-11 .077102 .17165 .025564 .227864 
1.25 .005776 2.4e-12 .066649 .182665 .015479 .239824 
1.3 .015815 1.3e-13 .056921 .193365 .005044 .250949 
1.35 .036924 6.9e-15 .047358 .204051 -.00456 .262509 
1.4 .074962 3.3e-16 .038051 .213975 -.01348 .273577 
1.45 .134644 0 .029011 .22399 -.022375 .283663 
1.5 .217315 0 .020704 .233625 -.031225 .294048 
1.55 .319641 0 .012713 .243005 -.039881 .304174 
1.6 .434016 0 .004402 .251651 -.048636 .314212 
1.65 .550543 0 -.003215 .260872 -.056577 .323736 
1.7 .659647 0 -.010632 .270042 -.064341 .3328 
1.75 .754213 0 -.017719 .278234 -.07206 .342276 
1.8 .830583 0 -.02446 .286335 -.079956 .351521 
1.85 .888379 0 -.031389 .294469 -.087177 .360806 
1.9 .929581 0 -.038388 .302457 -.09428 .369846 
1.95 .957378 0 -.044971 .309998 -.101023 .37805 
2 .9752 0 .051685 .317776  - .107678 .386405 
* gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
sig+   - upper bound significance level  
sig-   - lower bound significance level  
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 





Annex 1.9. Balance tests for robustness checks 
 
Table 1.9a – alternative matching algorithms 
 NN3 RADIUS 
Variable 2013 2012 2011 2010 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Revenues 0_1  0.775 0.726 0.141 0.773 0.233 0.177 0.183 0.773 
Revenues 1_2  1.000 1.000 0.848 0.762 0.841 0.865 0.552 0.795 
Revenues 2_10 0.387 0.359 0.314 0.828 0.700 0.971 0.708 0.784 
Revenues 10_50  0.880 0.542 0.699 0.584 0.656 0.482 0.831 0.802 
Revenues 50 0.246 0.461 0.093* 0.898 0.840 0.942 0.461 0.983 
Value added per 
employee 0.446 0.575 0.406 0.558 0.355 0.770 0.479 0.409 
Profit per 
employee  0.512 0.019** 0.986 0.929 0.968 0.228 0.847 0.210 
Labour cost per 
employee  0.203 0.072* 0.918 0.593 0.034 0.303 0.816 0.714 
Age 
0.308 0.114 0.552 0.605 0.368 0.096* 0.995 0.980 
Intangible 
Capital 0.535 0.320 0.333 0.802 0.197 0.969 0.752 0.819 
Leverage 
0.533 0.825 0.937 0.859 0.707 0.830 0.868 0.423 
Area 
0.932 0.319 0.921 0.841 0.468 0.585 0.950 0.585 
Agriculture 1.000 . 1.000 . 1.000 . 1.000 . 
Extraction . . . . . . . . 
Manufacturing 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Waste 1.000 . 1.000 1.000 1.000 . 1.000 1.000 
Construction 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 . 
Trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Transportation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tourism 1.000 1.000 . 1.000 1.000 . . . 
Other services 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p>chi2 0.984 0.413 0.921 1.000 0.978 0.834 1.000 0.999 
 
Table 1.9b – exclusion of labour productivity 
 
 NN5 
Variable 2013 2012 2011 2013 
Revenues 0_1  0.613 0.402 0.165 0.074* 
Revenues 1_2  1.000 0.857 0.656 0.337 
Revenues 2_10 0.272 0.190 0.230 0.369 
Revenues 10_50  0.716 0.548 0.840 0.210 
Revenues 50 0.159 0.130 0.026 0.207 
Value added per 
employee 0.556 0.348 0.615 0.575 
Profit per employee  
0.745 0.689 0.742 0.940 
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Labour cost per 
employee  0.105 0.521 0.603 0.558 
Age 
0.097* 0.199 0.988 0.583 
Intangible Capital 
0.539 0.773 0.270 0.209 
Leverage 
0.958 0.815 0.977 0.915 
Area 
0.920 0.615 0.709 0.949 
Agriculture 1.000 . 1.000 . 
Extraction . . . . 
Manufacturing 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.953 
Waste 1.000 . 1.000 0.752 
Construction 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Transportation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tourism 1.000 1.000 . 1.000 
Other services 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p>chi2 0.986 0.579 0.853 0.916 
 
Table 1.9c – exclusion of labour cost per employee 
 
 NN5 
Variable 2013 2012 2011 2013 
Revenues 0_1  0.694 0.714 0.178 0.03** 
Revenues 1_2  0.894 0.961 0.694 0.482 
Revenues 2_10 0.517 0.201 0.122 0.317 
Revenues 10_50  0.980 0.555 0.706 0.154 
Revenues 50 0.169 0.198 0.018** 0.316 
Value added per 
employee 0.577 0.400 0.345 0.328 
Profit per employee  
0.969 0.034** 0.892 0.836 
Labour cost per 
employee  0.144 0.297 0.986 0.558 
Age 
0.980 0.199 0.988 0.491 
Intangible Capital 
0.623 0.248 0.384 0.233 
Leverage 
0.959 0.491 0.770 0.830 
Area 
0.920 0.629 0.709 0.823 
Agriculture 1.000 . 0.862 . 
Extraction . . . . 
Manufacturing 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.952 
Waste 1.000 . 1.000 0.752 
Construction 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Transportation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tourism 1.000 1.000 . 1.000 
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Other services 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p>chi2 1.000 0.384 0.732 0.762 
 
Table 1.9d – exclusion of Italian M&A 
 
 NN5 
Variable 2013 2012 2011 2013 
Revenues 0_1  0.766 0.582 0.290 0.098 
Revenues 1_2  0.939 1.000 0.451 0.351 
Revenues 2_10 0.297 0.226 0.331 0.264 
Revenues 10_50  0.886 0.654 0.853 0.076* 
Revenues 50 0.153 0.094* 0.047** 0.377 
Value added per 
employee 0.719 0.494 0.379 0.583 
Profit per employee  
0.678 0.049** 0.809 0.837 
Labour cost per 
employee  0.812 0.436 0.821 0.141 
Age 
0.130 0.157 0.996 0.702 
Intangible Capital 
0.445 0.840 0.488 0.260 
Leverage 
0.939 0.643 0.879 0.803 
Area 
0.457 0.895 0.895 0.640 
Agriculture . . . . 
Extraction . . . . 
Manufacturing 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Waste . . . . 
Construction 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Transportation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tourism . . . . 
Other services 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p>chi2 0.996 0.583 0.957 0.904 
 
Table 1.9e – exclusion of less relevant industries 
 
 NN5 
Variable 2013 2012 2011 2013 
Revenues 0_1  0.580 0.451 0.164 0.073* 
Revenues 1_2  0.851 0.965 0.322 0.312 
Revenues 2_10 0.422 0.196 0.228 0.296 
Revenues 10_50  0.832 0.633 0.655 0.173 
Revenues 50 0.170 0.082* 0.021** 0.178 
Value added per 
employee 0.769 0.905 0.311 0.463 
Profit per employee  
0.613 0.156 0.992 0.959 
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Labour cost per 
employee  0.138 0.502 0.612 0.441 
Age 
0.128 0.162 0.743 0.561 
Intangible Capital 
0.440 0.855 0.311 0.240 
Leverage 
0.763 0.685 0.435 0.724 
Area 
0.616 0.568 0.618 0.788 
Agriculture 1.000 . 1.000 . 
Extraction . . . . 
Manufacturing 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.974 
Waste 1.000 . 1.000 0.882 
Construction 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Transportation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tourism 1.000 . . 1.000 
Other services 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p>chi2 0.959 0.39 0.606 0.805 
 
 
Table 1.9f – exclusion of out-of-business target firms 
 
 NN5 
Variable 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Revenues 0_1  0.612 0.714 0.296 0.055* 
Revenues 1_2  0.638 0.885 0.254 0.379 
Revenues 2_10 0.610 0.272 0.525 0.473 
Revenues 10_50  0.902 0.614 0.794 0.232 
Revenues 50 0.229 0.193 0.066* 0.233 
Value added per 
employee 0.985 0.414 0.941 0.242 
Profit per employee  0.655 0.067* 0.495 0.813 
Labour cost per 
employee  0.128 0.061* 0.574 0.416 
Age 0.281 0.313 0.252 0.891 
Intangible Capital 0.831 0.296 0.067* 0.138 
Leverage 0.496 0.544 0.692 0.478 
Area 0.711 0.524 0.850 0.942 
Agriculture 1.000 . 1.000 . 
Extraction . . . . 
Manufacturing 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.947 
Waste 1.000 . 1.000 0.753 
Construction 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Transportation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tourism 1.000 1.000 . 1.000 
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Other services 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 














2. Key factors affecting the impact of cross 




Following the significant increase in the number of M&A activities across the last decade, the first chapter 
investigated how cross-border M&A deals affect target firms’ productivity, by looking at the Italian case. The 
study finds that Italian firms have benefitted from foreign ownership in terms of productivity: in the third year 
after the acquisition, the total factor productivity (tfp) of Italian target firms is 12,7% higher than the one of a 
sample of purely domestic firms with similar characteristics. In finding so, that piece of research has left room 
for additional study, specifically on the determinants of the variation in target firms’ productivity. Thereby, the 
second chapter will briefly examine the most important factors affecting the impact of foreign investments 
which, according to economic literature, are: type of deal, industry heterogeneity, capital share, distance and 
acquiring firm-related characteristics. Then, it will focus the attention on an additional factor, which is not 
been considered by other economic studies but that is likely to have an effect on the performance of foreign-
acquired firms, that is the type of buyer (which can be either strategic or financial). Understanding the extent 
and the mechanisms behind efficiency changes on target firms could also help provide policy advices on how 
to benefit the most from them.  
To perform the analysis, target firms will be divided in two subsamples (strategic- and financial-acquired firms, 
according to the key factors identified (i.e. type of buyer), and matched with firms with ex-ante similar 
characteristics (control group), in accordance to the procedure followed in Chapter 1 (Difference-in-Difference 
Matching). So, this study does not aspire to determine the causal effect between key M&A characteristics and 
productivity change of target firms, but it seeks to describe how subsamples of firms vary their productivity 
after been taken over by foreign investors.  
Results confirm the key role played by the variable type of buyer when variations in target firms’ productivity 
are considered. In fact, Italian target firms acquired by foreign investors operating in the non-financial sector 
(i.e. strategic buyers) show an increase in their 3-year post-acquisition productivity, while the same does not 
occur when target firms are taken over by financial investors. This can be explained by the primary concern 
for strategic buyers, who typically follow a buy and hold strategy, of increasing the firms’ efficiency by 
optimizing the process and eliminating redundancies, compared to financial buyers, whose main objective is 
to generate high return for investors. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the most relevant economic literature on the topic, section 
3 explains the methodology implemented, section 4 provides a statistical description of the sample, section 5 
illustrates the results of the matching analysis, section 6 includes some robustness checks and, finally, section 




2.2 Literature review  
The section aims at understanding which are the main variables that could influence firms’ performances after 
a cross-border M&A; thus, to serve the purpose, it is necessary to identify M&A-related key features that - 
according to economic literature - are most likely to have an impact on the target firms’ performance. 
A main feature that is usually considered in this strand of research is the type of M&A, which is the motive 
behind the decision of investing. In case of strategic vertical (upstream or downstream) deals, productivity 
measures typically capture the impact of technology transfer as new technological innovations, advanced 
managerial practices and product specialization increase production and process efficiency, that result into 
higher productivity. However, productivity measures can also catch the effect of firm-level scale economies in 
presence of fixed cost of production (knowledge, reputation, brand), which instead is often the case with 
horizontal/market seeking FDI. These different effects are unfortunately hard to isolate as they may come 
simultaneously, however a distinction among types of M&A deals (horizontal, vertical and conglomerate) can 
help us understand which effects have been more prominent. As it is shown in Hendricks & Li (2013), 
horizontal M&A – defined as merging companies belonging to the same industry – and vertical M&A – defined 
as merging companies operating at different levels within a supply chain for one specific finished product – 
can indeed have a different impact. According to the literature reviewed, a methodology commonly adopted to 
distinguish between M&A types is the one developed by Fan and Lang (2000) or Fan and Goyal (2006), which 
is based on the coefficient of industry relatedness17. Thanks to this method, cross border M&As involving US 
firms have been divided into three categories: 
- Horizontal, when acquirer and target firms belong to the same 4-digit SIC sector 
- Vertical, when acquirer and target firms do not belong to the same 4-digit SIC sector, but their sectors 
show high level of relatedness (either forward or backward) 
- Conglomerate, when acquirer and target firms neither belong to the same 4-digit SIC sector nor their 
sectors show high level of relatedness (either forward or backward) 
Furthermore, some studies (Benfratello and Sembenelli 2002, Girma et al. 2006, Schiffbauer et al 2009) have 
investigated the country of origin of the investor, to find out to what extent the effects on productivity and 
employment may vary depending on the country of origin of the acquiring firm. In fact, according to this theory 
the transfer of knowledge and efficiency will be higher if the acquiring and target countries are closer in 
geographical or cultural terms. This type of analysis is usually done by dividing cross-border operations 
according to the geographical origin of the buyer (UE, USA, other). Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) for 
example find a positive effect on target firms, but only in the case of US investors.  
 
17 The authors use US input-output tables to calculate a so-called coefficient of vertical relatedness, Vατ, which 
expresses how much the input industry α contributes in value-added to the output of industry τ. A threshold level 
indicates whether the two sectors are to be considered as being vertically integrated. 
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Following Nocke and Yeaple’s (2007) theoretical suggestions, other studies (e.g. Hughes and Saleheen 2012, 
Schiffbauer et al 2009) have tried to understand if heterogeneity across industries can affect different target 
firms’ performances. For example in a study on UK firms, Schiffbauer et al (2009) classify acquiring firms in 
relation to their industry and find that the effects of foreign acquisitions vary across industry (positive effect 
are largest in electronic industries); furthermore, the study confirms the theoretical predictions of the Nocke 
and Yeaple model, finding a greater effect on productivity when the acquirer operates in a R&D-intensive 
industry compared to acquirers operating in marketing-intensive sectors.  
Another significant aspect concerns acquiring firms’ related characteristics – such as level of productivity, firm 
size, level of intangible fixed assets or number of patents – which can all be responsible of a diverse effect of 
foreign ownership on the target firms’ performance. In fact, the higher the ownership advantage that a 
multinational firm possesses, along with its transferability and the complementarity/relatedness with the target 
firms' assets, the higher the productivity effect on the target firm is expected to be. The share of capital the 
investor owns in the target firm can also be a discriminating factor. A 100% control may help target firms to 
reap synergies and efficiency gains in a more rapid and direct way, compared to smaller shares. On the contrary, 
a full control may reduce the acquired firm’s chances of benefitting from potentially advantageous influences 
arising from a more differentiated shareholding structure. In conclusion, the resulting effect is potentially 
uncertain. To the knowledge of the author, there are no studies that have dealt with these last aspects yet. 
For a short recap of empirical studies on key factors affecting the impact of cross border M&A see also Annex 
1, which summarizes them in tabular form.  
The present research work fits into this stream of studies, because it aims to analyze the role of an additional 
industry-related key factor, which has been completely overlooked by previous studies but that can be useful 
to explain difference in firms’ performances after a foreign acquisition, i.e. the type of buyer. According to 
economic literature (Hege et al. 2012, Martos-Vila et al. 2019) acquiring firms can be divided in two groups: 
strategic (operating companies) or financial (investment companies) buyers. In business terms, a strategic 
buyer is typically the one looking for horizontal or vertical expansion, pursuing strategic synergies that will 
improve their operations, for example by absorbing products or services of the target firm into its business. On 
the other hand, a financial buyer is interested in investing in a certain company and making high returns out of 
this investment. This type of buyer usually identifies firms with considerable growth potential, uses leverage 
to finance the acquisition and would likely keep the acquired company for some years (typically 5 to 7) before 
seeking an exit to realize return on investment. A strategic buyer is interested in a “buy and hold” strategy and 
it will likely bring about visible changes in the target entity, by integrating it into the main business. Its goal is 
to generate some early synergies, typically by removing redundancies and optimizing processes. A financial 
buyer, on the contrary, may often take a more advisory role, by leaving day-to-day operations to the current 
team and most of the personnel in place, being more interested in generating acceptable return for investors 
than business synergies. Then, in theory, strategic buyers may have higher chances to positively impact target 
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firms’ productivity than financial buyers, yet to date there is no empirical work testing this hypothesis; this 
study will try to test this theoretical prediction by looking at the Italian case. 
2.3 Empirical strategy  
To investigate the role played by the variable type of buyer in explaining the post-acquisition performance of 
foreign-acquired firms, the same empirical methodology adopted in chapter 1 is employed, which is a 
Difference-in-Difference Matching approach. 
Difference-in-Difference Matching (DiDM): 
The empirical strategy involves a double Propensity Score matching analysis, where target firms are first split 
in subgroups (strategic- and financial-acquired firms) according to the relevant key factor examined (type of 
buyer) and then the matching is performed for each subgroups of firms in a separate way. The matching 
procedure has been already described in the Identification Strategy of Chapter 1, so in this paragraph only the 
major phases will be reviewed.  
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the Difference-in-Difference Matching (DiDM) Estimator 
allows to take into account both ex-ante differences in observed firm characteristics, overcoming the selection 
bias problem (i.e. cross border M&A target firms are different from non-target firms), and temporally invariant 
differences in outcome levels, i.e. firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. So, target firms are compared with 
domestic firms with ex-ante similar characteristics (control group) on the basis of a propensity score (PS), 
which is defined as the probability of treatment (T) assignment conditional on observed baseline covariates 𝑿 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin,1983).  
𝑷𝑺(𝑿) = 𝑷𝒓[𝑻 = 𝟏|𝑿] 














Following the first chapter, to match treated and untreated subjects with similar scores, three matching 
algorithms are used: 3-Nearest neighbour with replacement18, 5-Nearest neighbour with replacement19 and 
 
18 Every treated is matched with three untreated and untreated individuals can be used only once as a match. 
19 Every treated is matched with five untreated and untreated individuals can be used only once as a match. 
𝑾𝒊𝒋 denotes the weight given to the j − th case in making the comparison with the i − th treated case ( 0 <  Wji  1)   
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Radius20. If the three underlying assumptions – conditional independence21, common support and balancing – 
are true, the analysis mimics a randomized assignment and, conditioning on the propensity score, unbiased 
estimates can be obtained.  
Within each 2-digit NACE sector, firms are matched conditioned on a propensity score, which, in this thesis, 
correspond to the firm’s probability of foreign acquisition; the variables selected for the estimation of the 
propensity score equation are the following22: 
Table 2.1. Baseline variables for the estimation of the propensity score  
Variable name Description 
Revenues 0_1  From 0 to 1 ml € of revenues 
Revenues 1_2  From 1 to 2 ml € of revenues 
Revenues 2_10 From 2 to 10 ml € of revenues 
Revenues 10_50  From 10 to 50 ml € of revenues 
Revenues 50 Over 50 ml € of revenues 
Value added per employee Value added per employee 
Profit per employee  Profit per employee 
Age Years of business 
Labour cost per employee Labour cost per employee  
Intangible Capital Intangible fixed assets over total assets 
Leverage Debts over total assets 
Area North-Central Italy vs South-Islands Italy 
 
2.4 Data description  
The empirical analysis employs an integrated dataset, which contains information both on target firms – Italian 
firms subject to cross-border M&A between 2010 and 2013 – and acquiring firms – foreign investors who 
undertake a M&A deal targeting Italian firms between 2010 and 2013. The whole dataset is constructed first 
by combining two databases on foreign investments, Reprint by Ice and Politecnico di Milano - which provides 
information on the identity of Italian multinational and foreign-owned firms - and Zephyr by Bureau van Dijk 
- which provides data on M&A deals and rumors across the world. Then, other two databases on firms’ 
accounting variables are added, both provided by Bureau van Dijk: AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata Delle 
Aziende) - which contains classified balance sheets of more than 700.000 Italian firms – for target firms and 
Orbis - which contains classified information on around 300 million companies across the world – for 
acquiring firms.  
Data on cross-border M&A deals targeting Italian firms between the years 2010 and 2013 - resulting in the 
foreign investor holding a control share (≥ 50%) - have been collected using in a complementary way the two 
databases Reprint and Zephyr. As mentioned in Blankenburg A. (2020), the resulting group would have 
 
20 Every treated is matched with untreated individuals that lies within the caliper (‘propensity range’). 
21     A sensitivity test, following the Rosenbaum bounds approach, will allow to determine how strongly an unmeasured 
confounding variable affects selection into treatment and undermine the results from the matching analysis 
22 For an in-depth analysis of the Propensity Score variable selection see Identification Strategy of Chapter 1. 
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summed up to 1155 firms (acquired between 2010 and 2013 by a foreign investor), but unfortunately over half 
of these firms could not be included because on the database AIDA they displayed non-positive or missing 
values on most relevant variables, guaranteeing a final coverage of 53%, which results in 612 firms 
representing the ‘treatment’ group. Out of these 612, only 504 firms display values for the outcome variable 
(tfp) in the third year after the acquisition, while the remaining 108 firms show missing values in that year; 
thereby in this study the sample will only consider these 504 target firms and related M&A deals.  
Data on foreign investors are collected through the database Orbis, which guarantees a 91% level of coverage, 
corresponding to 457 cross border M&A deals with information available for both target and acquiring firms. 
This sample of deals - and related firms - represents indeed the bulk of this analysis. The number of acquiring 
firms may not strictly correspond to the number of M&A deals, as some investor may have carried out more 
than one acquisition. In this sample, foreign investors are found to be 378, which confirms that some of them 
have acquired more than one Italian firms during the years 2010-2013. 
It could be interesting to review the main characteristics – according to economic literature - of cross border 
M&A deals targeting Italian firms between 2010 and 2013.  
Graph 2.1 – Distribution of cross border M&A deals by cultural and geographical distance, type of M&A, 





First, it is possible to see where investments come from. Geographical proximity is a drive for cross border 
M&A in the Italian case, as over half of the acquirers are European23, followed by North America and Rest of 
the world.  
In the sample, M&A deals are primarily conglomerate (57%), which means involving firms operating in 
unrelated sectors, while a smaller part is vertical (25%) and fewer are horizontal (18%). The classification of 
M&As into vertical, horizontal and conglomerate has been done by following the methodology developed by 
Fan and Lang (2000), which is based on the coefficient of industry relatedness. In short, horizontal M&A are 
all the deals where target and acquirer operate in the same NACE 3-digit industry code. The remaining deals 
are then classified into vertical or conglomerate M&A according to whether the inter-industry relatedness 
coefficient is above or below a certain threshold (in our case 0.1). These coefficients have been derived from 
the Italian Input-Output table (Istat 2018)24, which groups sectors by NACE 2-digit industry code (second 
best), and not by 3-digit industry code, which would hypothetically be the first choice. 
Across the sample, the percentage of R&D intensive investors is however modest, as only 49 deals out of 457 
involve investors operating in high tech sectors. The list of high-tech sectors consists of a group of high-tech 
manufacturing industries (basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations, computers and 
electronic components, consumer electronics and optical instruments, measuring, testing, navigation and 
medical instruments, air and spacecraft and related machinery) and high-tech services industries (audiovisual 
and information activities, ICT related activities, scientific research and development) – also called Knowledge 
intensive services – according to the classification provided by the European Commission on R&D intensive 
– also called high-tech – sectors (Eurostat, 2016). 
Then, when considering the variable object of the current investigation i.e. type of buyer - which refers to the 
business distinction between strategic and financial buyers - it is possible to notice that over three quarters of 
investors are strategic buyers, so they come from non-financial sectors. In this study, buyers are classified 
according to the sector of origin following the Eurostat classification: strategic buyers – which are the ones 
pursuing a buy and hold strategy – come from either the manufacturing or service (other than financial) sector, 
while financial buyers – which are the ones interested in making a financial investment – operate instead in 
the financial sector25. 
As for target firms’ main features (control variables), Italian acquired firms are on average 23 years old, most 
of them comes from Center or North Italy (95%), almost one half operates in the manufacturing industry and 
only a small percentage of them (9%) is a micro-sized firm (less than 1ml € revenues). Lastly, with regard to 
 
23 28 countries. 
24 Reference years: 2010-2015. 
25 Section K, Nace Rev.2 (Eurostat). 
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the value of shares the investor owns in the target firm, over three quarters of the M&A deals end up in having 
the acquirer holding a 100% control of the target firm. 
2.5 Results 
To evaluate the different impact of cross border M&As on target firms’ productivity according to the type of 
buyer a double matching analysis is performed. As already mentioned, the analysis is a standard propensity 
score matching procedure, where firms are first divided in two subgroups (financial- or strategic-acquired 
firms) according to the relevant variable (type of buyer) and then matched with domestic firms with similar 
characteristics (control groups), as it is done in most of the studies on factors affecting the impact of cross-
border M&A (Girma et al. 2006, Schiffbauer et al 2009).  
The outcome variable is total factor productivity (tfp) in the third year after the M&A deal occurred. The choice 
of taking into consideration the third year post-acquisition for productivity is explained by the fact that the 
effect of foreign takeover is at its most three years after the acquisition, as it has been pointed out in chapter 1 
(section 1.5 results). 
The matching algorithm is NN526 and the specification is the one described in the Empirical Strategy, which 
is the same applied in Chapter 1. What results show is a delta of 21,3 percentage point in the third-year post-
acquisition productivity between the two groups of target firms. That is, when target firms are acquired by 
investors who operate in the financial sector there is no significant productivity effect (they actually decrease 
their productivity by 9.8% but the effect is not statistically significant different from zero, which is due to the 
higher standard error, deriving from considering a smaller sample of firms27), while when firms are acquired 
by strategic investors they increase their productivity by 11.5%.  A one-year common trend (CT) assumption - 
to understand whether the target and control groups had different pre-acquisition outcome paths – is also tested, 
showing similar pre-acquisition trajectories for both subgroups. The balancing assumption – which involves 
that the control group has a distribution of covariates very similar to the treatment group – and the common 
support assumption – which states that every subject has a nonzero probability to receive either treatment – 
are satisfied for each subgroup (see annex 2.2 and 2.3). As the Rosenbaum bounds test28 shows (annex 2.4) the 
positive productivity effect for firms acquired by strategic investors is insensitive to a bias that would increase 
the odds of treatment by 10% but sensitive to a bias that would increase them by 20%, so only partially sensitive 
to hidden bias.  
 
26 which involves that each acquired firm is matched with five not-acquired firms - from the same 2-digit NACE sector - 
and not-acquired firms can be used only once as a match. 
27 121 firms are acquired by financial buyers. 
28 Which is a sensitivity test to investigate whether the causal effect estimated from the Propensity Score matching is 
vulnerable to the influence of unobserved covariates is run. 
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Table 2.2. Propensity Score Matching on two subsamples: productivity variation for target firms acquired by 
strategic and financial investors (PS match NN5) 
 Strategic   Financial 
 
Coef. 
 Std.Err T P>t 
Sample 
Size Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Sample  
Size 
Δtfp3year  .114514 .043352 2.64 0.008 1862 -.09825 .082484 -1.19 0.234  552 
Δtfp0year -0.0047 .004448 -1.08 0.281 1726 -.00501 .004509 -1.11 0.226  517 
 
What emerges from these previous results is the key role of the type of buyer in explaining variation in the 
target firms’ productivity. In fact, we observe that when target firms are acquired from strategic investors there 
is evidence of a positive effect on their productivity, which is not true if they are acquired by financial investors. 
This finding supports common business economic knowledge, which typically stresses the occurrence of 
positive synergies whenever the acquiring firm is a strategic buyer. Strategic buyers typically pursue a buy and 
hold strategy and are interested in removing redundancies and optimizing processes between the two firms. 
Conversely, financial buyers aim primarily at generating acceptable return for investors rather than reaching 
business synergies, leaving day-to-day operations to the current team and taking a more advisory role. What 
can be concluded is that looking at the sectors where the international investors operate may provide policy 
makers with some indications on how to boost national firms’ productivity. According to what has been found, 
public institutions working in a context of firm internationalization (International Trade Agencies, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Development) should address their efforts towards the attraction of 
foreign investments realized by strategic buyers, since these investors are more likely to boost target firms 
efficiency29, at least in a medium-term perspective. 
However, we must consider the existence of an alternative explanation that could be given to productivity 
variations, which takes into account the role of market power. In fact, the standard calculation of tfp (Olley 
and Pakes 1996, Levinsohn and Petrin 2003) does not allow to disentangle between productivity and market 
power, so what has been previously described as an efficiency effect it could be alternatively seen a mark-up 
change. In the present case, the lack of productivity effect when firms are acquired by financial investors may 
depend on a reduction of mark-up instead of the lack of achievement of positive business synergies. A way to 
remove all doubts, it would be to follow the approach suggested by Bloningen and Pierce (2016), who, by 
applying a difference-in-differences framework, manage to distinguish the two effects and eventually find 
increases in average markups, but no effect on productivity, for a sample of US plants subject to M&A deals. 
This in-depth analysis is however out of the scope of the present study, so the question is left open for future 
research works. 
2.6 Robustness checks 
 
29 No significant differences are instead found for the outcome variable employmentΔ3year. 
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As robustness checks, it is important to show how the results may vary by changing the way the outcome 
variable (target firms’ productivity on the third year after the acquisition) is calculated. As it has been pointed 
out in the Empirical Strategy section, three matching algorithms are used in this research work: 3-Nearest 
neighbour with replacement, 5-Nearest neighbour with replacement and Radius. In the results section, a 5-
Nearest neighbour with replacement30 algorithm has been adopted to calculate the net impact – or average 
treatment effect for the treated group (ATT) – thereby it becomes necessary to show how results vary using 
different matching algorithms.  
In the table below, a 3-Nearest neighbour with replacement31 algorithm is employed to calculate the outcome. 
What emerges is a positive productivity effect only when target firms are acquired by strategic investors, 
thereby confirming previous results. The balancing assumption is also satisfied for both subgroups of firms 
(see annex 2.3). 
Table 2.3. Propensity Score Matching on two subsamples: productivity variation for target firms acquired by 
strategic and financial investors (PS match NN3) 
 Strategic   Financial 
 
Coef. 
 Std.Err T P>t 
Sample 
Size Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Sample  
Size 
Δtfp3year  .124246 .04439 2.80 0.005  1300 -.11332 .084199 -1.35 0.179  375 
 
A further matching algorithm that can be employed to estimate the net effect (ATT) is the Radius32 (table 2.4). 
Here as well, estimates confirm the increase in 3-year post acquisition productivity for firms acquired by 
strategic investors, even though the delta between the two groups of firms is somewhat reduced (17 percentage 
point). Again, the balance test guarantees target and control firms are comparable in terms of pre-acquisition 
characteristics (see annex 2.3). 
 
Table 2.4. Propensity Score Matching on two subsamples: productivity variation for target firms acquired by 
strategic and financial investors (PS match Radius) 
 Strategic   Financial 
 
Coef. 
 Std.Err T P>t 
Sample 
Size Coef. Std.Err t P>t 
Sample  
Size 






30 Every treated is matched with five untreated and untreated individuals can be used only once as a match. 
31 Every treated is matched with three untreated and untreated individuals can be used only once as a match. 




The second chapter follows the first one, which finds a positive impact of cross border M&A deals on Italian 
firms’ productivity over the years 2010-2013, and seeks to identify the key source of productivity variation for 
Italian firms.  
According to existing literature, there are several factors which may potentially affect variations in firms’ 
productivity as a result of foreign investment: type of M&A (vertical, horizontal or conglomerate), industry 
heterogeneity (high-tech sector or not), cultural and geographical distance (communication and monitoring), 
capital share (degree of autonomy) and acquiring firms related-characteristics (productivity and level of 
intangible fixed assets). However, an additional - and overlooked - characteristic that can potentially influence 
the post-acquisition performance of foreign-acquired firms is the type of buyer, which is, according to the 
economic definition, the distinction between financial or strategic (or non-financial) acquirers. 
To study the role of the type of buyer, a propensity score matching procedure, which follows the methodology 
adopted in Chapter 1, is implemented on two different subsamples of target firms, i.e. financial- and strategic-
acquired firms. In doing so, a 5-Nearest neighbour algorithm (NN5) is employed, which involves that each 
acquired firm is matched with five not-acquired firms, from the same 2-digit NACE sector, as it was done in 
the first chapter. 
What emerges from the data is that the variable type of buyer plays indeed a key role, that is target firms 
acquired by strategic (non-financial) investors increase their productivity by over 21% with respect to firms 
acquired by strategic buyers. This finding supports business economic theory which sees financial buyers – 
more focused on generating high return for investors – opposed to strategic buyers – interested in removing 
redundancies, transfer best practices and generating positive synergies. This would explain the negative role 
played by financial investors in boosting firms’ productivity, compared to their counterparts (strategic buyers), 
who, by pursuing an integration of business through a buy and hold strategy, increased target firms’ efficiency. 
If this interpretation is correct, relevant policy implications can be derived: according to the present findings, 
public institutions dealing with foreign direct investments (International Trade Agencies, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Economic Development) should focus their effort on attracting investments coming from 
strategic investors, more than financial ones, since they will likely bring an increase in target firms’ overall 
level of efficiency. 
Two robustness checks are carried out in order to test the strength of the results obtained; they both aim at 
testing how results vary by using different matching algorithm (3-Nearest neighbour algorithm and Radius), 
within the Propensity Score procedure. Estimates confirm the positive productivity effect when target firms 






Annex 2.1. Empirical studies on key factors affecting cross-border M&As 
 
Table 2.1a. Empirical studies on key factors affecting cross-border M&As 
 Positive Negative 
Type Of M&A 
 
- Hendricks & Li (2013) find 
negative effect on employment 
in case of horizontal M&A. 
- Schiffbauer et al (2009) find no 
significant difference between 
horizontal and vertical deals. 
Geographical Distance - Benfratello and Sembenelli 
(2002) and Schiffbauer et al 
(2009) find a positive effect on 
target firms productivity in 
case of US investors.  
 
Industry Heterogeneity - Schiffbauer et al (2009) find 





Annex 2.2. Common support 
Graphs 2.2a – Testing the common support hypothesis for 2010, 2011 2012 and 2013 for firms acquired by 













































Annex 2.3. Balance test 






Strategic Financial Financial 
 
Strategic Financial 
Revenues 0_1  0.345 0.170 0.225 0.776 0.010** 0.010** 
Revenues 1_2  0.518 0.369 0.464 0.916 0.146 0.504 



























































































































Revenues 10_50  0.807 0.140 0.236 0.726 0.105 0.448 
Revenues 50 0.151 0.019* 0.090* 0.068* 0.547 0.301 
Value added per employee 
0.060* 0.773 0.463 0.201 0.380 0.801 
Profit per employee  
0.408 0.597 0.876 0.886 0.894 0.975 
Labour cost per employee  
0.768 0.736 0.550 0.248 0.176 0.772 
Age 
0.145 0.426 0.375 0.895 0.423 0.506 
Intangible Capital 
0.978 0.441 0.506 0.468 0.942 0.288 
Leverage 
0.987 0.630 0.751 0.928 0.790 0.929 
Area 
0.590 0.541 0.457 0.459 0.506 0.765 
Agriculture . . . . . . 
Manufacturing 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Waste 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Construction 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Transportation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tourism 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Other services 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p>chi2 0.719 0.979 0.986 0.937 0.745 
0.897 
 
Annex 2.4. Sensitivity test  
 
Table 2.4a Rosenbaum bounds for the effect on 3-year post acquisition TFP for firms acquired by strategic 
investors 
Rosenbaum bounds for tfp3yeardiff (N = 354 matched pairs) 
     
   Gamma        sig+             sig-             t-hat+           t-hat-          CI+            CI- 
     
1 
.003501 .003501 .082215 .082215 .022126 .141582 
1.1 .027275 .000253 .0587 .105533 -.00108 .165652 
1.2 .111339 .000014 .036929 .126229 -.022185 .188034 
1.3 .282711 5.7e-07 .017103 .146755 -.042952 .209647 
1.4 .508451 2.0e-08 -.000633 .165084 -.061946 .229667 
1.5 .71771 6.0e-10 -.01663 .182116 -.079587 .247926 
1.6 .863395 1.6e-11 -.032996 .198485 -.096406 .265698 
1.7 .943501 3.8e-13 -.047707 .214705 -.11163 .283697 
1.8 .97969 8.2e-15 -.062128 .229952 -.12708 .299433 
1.9 .993548 2.2e-16 -.075573 .243578 -.141831 .315103 
2 .998161 0 -.087499 .256923 -.154699 .33 
* gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
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sig+   - upper bound significance level  
sig-   - lower bound significance level  
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 
CI-    - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 
 
 
Table 2.4b Rosenbaum bounds for the effect on 3-year post acquisition TFP for firms acquired by financial 
investors 
Rosenbaum bounds for tfp3yeardiff (N = 101 matched pairs) 
      
     Gamma        sig+            sig-           t-hat+          t-hat-              CI+            CI- 
      
1 .296825 .296825 -.029824 -.029824 -.129236 .086829 
1.1 .17103 .452948 -.050562 -.005408 -.154214 .107265 
1.2 .091391 .602836 -.066558 .014402 -.176378 .125668 
1.3 .045899 .728964 -.085571 .038541 -.20156 .146348 
1.4 .021906 .824758 -.102014 .052085 -.222366 .161261 
1.5 .010022 .891845 -.118487 .072405 -.241842 .181771 
1.6 .004427 .935861 -.131164 .090125 -.261286 .197329 
1.7 .001899 .963244 -.147591 .102336 -.279737 .211914 
1.8 .000794 .979547 -.160289 .111526 -.302327 .226701 
1.9 .000325 .988905 -.174205 .123835 -.322953 .245075 
2 .000131 .994112 -.188713 .136759 -.341106 .256273 
* gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
sig+   - upper bound significance level   
sig-   - lower bound significance level   
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .95)  
CI-    - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .95)  




The thesis is about the economics of cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). It begins with a review 
of the literature of cross-border M&As and their performance effects on target firms. Then, it presents the 
propensity score matching, an econometric technique that allows to obtain unbiased estimates of causal effects 
in presence of selection bias. Once the effect of cross-border M&As on the target firms’ performance is 
estimated, the attention is shifted to the factors potentially accountable for it. The research work uses a panel 
integrated dataset about Italian firms and places the focus of the econometric analysis on a propensity score 
matching approach. Both chapters end with conclusions, but it is worthwhile drawing some concluding 
remarks for the whole thesis.    
As discussed in the first chapter, the majority of studies on the effect of cross-border M&As on target firms 
found mixed productivity and employment effects. This thesis, which looks at the Italian firms subject to cross-
border M&As from 2010 to 2013, found a positive long-term impact of foreign ownership in terms of 
productivity. The resulting efficiency gains could depend on a more efficient reallocation of production across 
firms, the presence of scale or scope economies, sourcing of technological knowledge or transfer of best 
practices. The effect of ownership change in terms of employment is also clear and positive, and it tends to 
increase over time. Apparently, foreign investors have not used the opportunity to cancel work contracts, as it 
is often stressed by the public opinion, but quite the contrary, enlarging their workforce in the years following 
the acquisition.   
A few lessons can be learned from the estimation strategy. The implementation of a counterfactual approach – 
such as propensity score matching – is pivotal when dealing with the causal effect of cross border M&As on 
target firms. In fact, as expected, there is self-selection in becoming a cross border M&A target across the 
sample. Foreign investors cherry-pick target firms which are larger in size, hold higher intangible capital, 
employ more skilled workers and are located in the more dynamic areas. As target firms differ from non-target 
domestic firms in some pre-acquisition characteristics, there is a need to select a comparable control group.   
Previous studies suggest taking into account heterogeneity among M&A deals. M&As can indeed be either 
vertical, horizontal or conglomerate, involve different levels of control and be carried out by different types of 
acquirers (high tech or not, geographically close or distant, strategic or financial,). The suggestion is quite 
useful: in fact, what the second chapter shows is that target firms acquired by strategic investors increase their 
productivity, while this does not happen with firms acquired by financial investors. This finding may find 
explanation in business economic theory: financial buyers – compared to strategic buyers – are more focused 
on generating high rates of return for their investors than transferring best practices and generating positive 
synergies with the acquired firm.   
Some policy implications can be also derived. If the objective is to maintain employment in the acquired firms, 
the public concern of workforce rationalization following a change in ownership (from national to foreign) 
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should be minimized, as no reduction in employment levels has been observed. If, instead, the objective is to 
increase the acquired firms’ productivity, a concern on the type of investors is legitimate given the different 
role played by strategic and financial buyers; in particular, public institution and policy makers should 
concentrate their efforts on the attraction of foreign investments realized by strategic investors, since they are 
more likely to boost the target firms’ productivity.  
This interpretation is in line with the profit maximizing hypothesis, however it must be bear in mind that the 
difference in productivity could be also be driven by a mark-up change (e.g. firms are acquired by financial 
investors see a decrease in their mark-up). The only way to measure the intensity of the two effects is to further 
decompose tfp, by, for example, following the approach suggested by Bloningen and Pierce (2016), who 
applied a difference-in-differences framework to disentangle the effects. This must be indeed the task of future 
research works on the topic. 
From a methodological standpoint, results are robust several robustness checks, which involve the use of 
alternative matching algorithms, different specifications of the equation model and the analysis of firms’ sub-
samples. The main limitation of the study is an incomplete coverage of the sample of firms (53% of the number 
of Italian firms subjected to cross-border M&As between 2010 and 2013) due to missing data for relevant 
variables (essential for the calculation of total factor productivity). However, a more detailed analysis shows 
that there isn’t any notable difference between included and not included target firms, except for their age: not 
included target firms are indeed younger (25% of which are start-ups), which can partially explain the lack of 
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